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JUSTICE SCALIA’S BANKRUPTCY JURISPRUDENCE: THE RIGHT 





This Article surveys an area of Justice Scalia’s legacy that is often 
overlooked by scholars who write broadly about the Supreme Court: his 
many contributions to the field of bankruptcy law. The Bankruptcy Code 
is rife with statutory interpretation questions that demand clear and 
predictable answers, due to the efficiency interests at stake and the 
absence of any intermediate interpretive forces, such as administrative 
agencies. Justice Scalia arrived on the high court at the outset of the 
modern bankruptcy era and this Article argues that his brand of rule-
based textualism is a particularly good fit for bankruptcy law. 
Specifically, four themes emerge from Justice Scalia’s bankruptcy 
writings: a holistic approach to the Bankruptcy Code, a commitment to 
textual justice, a vocal crusade against legislative history, and an 
insistence on clear rules to delineate bankruptcy judges’ powers. A review 
of Justice Scalia’s decisions exemplifying these themes leads to some 
surprising and perhaps counterintuitive conclusions about the ways in 
which his approach to the Bankruptcy Code often benefited individual 
debtors over larger creditors, particularly consumer lenders. This Article 
argues that each aspect of this philosophy promotes predictability and 
clarity, thereby furthering the ultimate purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Despite these advantages, Justice Scalia’s philosophy has not been 
widely embraced. To help explain this paradox, this Article identifies 
several bankruptcy decisions in which Justice Scalia did not faithfully 
follow his own rules, thereby muddying his overall message to lower 
courts and litigants. Nonetheless, this Article concludes by urging 
bankruptcy judges and practitioners to look past these exceptions and 
continue to press a rule-based textualist approach. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
A jurisprudential giant in life, and seemingly larger than life in death, Justice 
Antonin Scalia will undoubtedly inspire much discussion in the years, decades, and 
perhaps even centuries to come. This Article seeks to further the conversation in one 
discrete area of his jurisprudence: bankruptcy law. Bankruptcy has been described 
as a “proving ground” for theories of statutory construction.1 Justice Scalia has 
issued a number of powerful opinions, concurrences, and dissents in the bankruptcy 
field, including many seminal bankruptcy cases.2 Yet surprisingly little academic 
attention is paid to his contributions to the field. For example, a recently published 
posthumous collection of Scalia’s “landmark”3 opinions and dissents does not 
contain a single bankruptcy case.4 Similarly, scholars who write broadly about 
competing theories of statutory interpretation rarely engage deeply with decisions 
interpreting the Bankruptcy Code.5   
This gap is an oversight that prevents full consideration of Justice Scalia’s 
philosophy and its impact on the law, courts, and the public. Although bankruptcy 
is often regarded in academic circles as a somewhat esoteric area of practice,6 its 
scope and impact on the public is huge: close to a million people file bankruptcy 
each year.7 To quantify the impact of bankruptcy law, one set of commentators noted 
that more people file for bankruptcy each year than get divorced, graduate from 
college, and are diagnosed with cancer combined.8 Each filer has dozens or perhaps 
even hundreds of creditors, at least some of whom still hope to recover a portion of 
what they are owed when all is said and done. The interests of these various 
stakeholders are overseen by approximately 350 bankruptcy judges who serve 
                                                      
1 Hon. Marjorie O. Rendell, 2003—A Year of Discovery: Cybergenics and Plain 
Meaning in Bankruptcy Cases, 49 VILL. L. REV. 887, 887 (2004). 
2 Id.  
3 KEVIN A. RING, SCALIA’S COURT: A LEGACY OF LANDMARK OPINIONS AND DISSENTS 
(2016). 
4 Id. at 557–60.  
5 Mark Tushnet is a notable exception. He used Justice Scalia’s dissent in Ransom v. 
FIA Card Servs., N.A., 562 U.S. 61, 80–85 (2011), to demonstrate the shared ground between 
textualism and purposivism. See Mark Tushnet, Theory and Practice in Statutory 
Interpretation, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1185, 1187–90 (2011). This Article uses Ransom along 
with several other bankruptcy decisions to develop and refine this argument. See infra 
Sections V.A, V.B. 
6 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 
595–96 (1998) (describing the “traditionalist” view that bankruptcy is fundamentally 
different from other areas of the law and therefore can be “meaningfully separated from 
every other part of our legal universe.”). 
7 See U.S. COURTS, MARCH 2017 BANKRUPTCY FILINGS DOWN 4.7 PERCENT (April 19, 
2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2017/04/19/march-2017-bankruptcy-filings-down-
47-percent [https://perma.cc/EQ8D-JFZP]. 
8 See LISA A. KEISTER & DARBY E. SOUTHGATE, INEQUALITY: A CONTEMPORARY 
APPROACH TO RACE, CLASS, AND GENDER 166 (2012). 
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within each of the ninety-four federal districts.9 Thus, to overlook Justice Scalia’s 
contributions to the bankruptcy field is to ignore a major aspect of his impact on the 
courts and on the public.  
This Article seeks to bridge this gap by explaining Justice Scalia’s key 
contributions to the bankruptcy field in a way that a nonspecialist audience can 
understand and appreciate. Specifically, this Article explores his contributions to 
interpreting the modern bankruptcy code: the Bankruptcy Reform Act enacted by 
Congress in 1978,10 together with amendments including the substantive changes 
introduced by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 
2005 (“BAPCPA”).11 By studying Justice Scalia’s philosophy within the narrow 
confines of the Supreme Court’s bankruptcy jurisprudence, this Article demonstrates 
that many of his core principles were a boon to the field. However, for reasons also 
explored in this Article, his judicial philosophy did not make as clear a mark on the 
field as one might expect.12 In addition, this Article highlights several instances in 
which Justice Scalia interpreted the Code in a way that favored ordinary consumers 
or small creditors over large business interests, thereby challenging the conventional 
wisdom that the Justice only embraces “liberal”13 views in discrete areas of criminal 
procedure.14  
                                                      
9 See History of the Federal Judiciary: Bankruptcy Judgeships, FED. JUD. CTR., 
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges_bank.html [https://perma.cc/6X7L-
AZNU]. By way of contrast, there are 663 district court judges. See Table of Authorized 
Judgeships from 1789 to the Present, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-
judgeships/authorized-judgeships [https://perma.cc/PPR8-HXQ4]. 
10 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). 
11 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005). Other intervening changes include Bankruptcy Amendments and 
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984); Bankruptcy Judges, 
United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 
Stat. 3088 (1986); and Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 
(1994). See Karen Gebbia, Certiorari and the Bankruptcy Code: The Statutory Interpretation 
Cases, 90 AM. BANKR. L.J. 503, 517 n.37 (2016) (listing the most significant changes to the 
Bankruptcy Code since 1978). 
12 See, e.g., Hon. Thomas F. Waldron & Neil M. Berman, Principled Principles of 
Statutory Interpretation: A Judicial Perspective After Two Years of BAPCPA, 81 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 195, 202 (2007) (commenting that a “candid assessment” of the Supreme 
Court’s bankruptcy jurisprudence “finds confusion, if not contradiction”); see also Lee 
Dembart & Bruce A. Markell, Alive at 25? A Short Review of the Supreme Court’s 
Bankruptcy Jurisprudence, 1979–2004, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 373, 386–87 (2004) (arguing 
that in twenty-five years of interpreting the Code, the Court had failed to provide any 
meaningful clarity for lower court judges, notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s textual 
revolution). But see Rendell, supra note 1, at 887 (arguing that the Court’s holistic approach 
to interpretation has provided helpful guidance to lower courts). 
13 See, e.g., George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE 
L.J. 1297, 1300–02 (1990) (explaining that Justice Scalia’s “conservative” approach to 
criminal procedure highlights the ways in which his jurisprudence leads to “liberal” 
outcomes). 
14 See infra Section V.A. A recent book broadly explores Justice Scalia’s deviations 
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This Article proceeds as follows. Section II lays out the conventional wisdom 
regarding Justice Scalia and outlines some of the controversial aspects of his 
jurisprudence. Section III assesses Justice Scalia’s overall contributions to 
bankruptcy law and shows that he played a leading role in the development of 
modern bankruptcy law. Section IV identifies the ways in which bankruptcy differs 
from most other areas of the law, with a particular focus on why Justice Scalia’s 
rule-based textualism is an excellent fit for modern bankruptcy practice. Section V 
highlights those bankruptcy cases in which Justice Scalia best articulated a vision of 
rule-based textualism that brings clarity and predictability to bankruptcy practice. 
Section VI highlights those bankruptcy decisions in which Justice Scalia appears to 
have undermined the rules that he articulated so well in other cases, thereby clouding 
his overall message. Section VII concludes. 
 
II.  JUSTICE SCALIA’S OVERALL JURISPRUDENCE 
 
Few justices in recent memory have inspired so much regular and ongoing 
controversy as Justice Scalia. The commentary immediately following his death 
represents just a microcosm of the opinions expressed throughout his years on the 
high court, but it captures the range of perspectives voiced by the academic and legal 
communities over the past thirty years.15 As far as his jurisprudential legacy, scholars 
predicted both positive and negative developments, including an increased use of 
originalist arguments16 and widespread public acceptance of the notion that 
textualists are more faithful to democratic principles than other jurists.17 
                                                      
from conservative positions. DAVID M. DORSEN, THE UNEXPECTED SCALIA: A 
CONSERVATIVE JUSTICE’S LIBERAL OPINIONS xiv (2017). However, Dorsen does not 
consider Justice Scalia’s bankruptcy writings in any real depth. Id. at 226; see also infra note 
245 (discussing Dorsen’s brief reference to two Scalia dissents that he contends were pro-
consumer). 
15 See, e.g., Symposium, How Antonin Scalia Changed America: 19 Top Legal 
Thinkers on the Justices Legacy for the Court, the Law, and the Public, POLITICO MAGAZINE, 
(Feb. 14, 2016), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/02/antonin-scalia-how-he-
changed-america-213631 [https://perma.cc/Y6QD-H87F] (“Scalia shaped many, many 
minds and hearts—perhaps more so than he shaped the doctrine itself.”). 
16 According to George Mason Law Professor, Ilya Somin, (whose institution was for 
a short time to be renamed the Antonin Scalia School of Law before it was quickly re-
renamed the Antonin Scalia Law School, in order to avoid an unsavory acronym): 
 
In landmark recent cases addressing federalism, the right to bear arms and other 
important issues, both sides made extensive use of originalist arguments that 
would have been unusual a generation ago. When it comes to statutory 
interpretation, judges of all political stripes take text more seriously than they 
might have in the 1980s. Some of that progress is undoubtedly due to Scalia’s 
forceful and effective advocacy. 
 
Ilya Somin, Symposium, supra note 15, at 2. 
17 University of Pennsylvania Law School’s Professor Kermit Roosevelt wrote 
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At the center of many debates over Justice Scalia’s legacy is his particular 
brand of textualism. According to the Justice himself, his philosophy on how to 
interpret text was a simple one: the text should be “construed reasonably, to contain 
all that it fairly means.”18 As then-Tenth Circuit Judge Neil Gorsuch explained in a 
2016 speech, Scalia sought “to apply the law as it is, focusing backward, not 
forward, and looking to text, structure, and history to decide what a reasonable 
reader at the time of the events in question would have understood the law to be.”19  
Importantly for Justice Scalia, appropriate consideration of “history” included 
the views of the Founding Fathers about the meaning of constitutional text,20 but 
emphatically did not include the views of legislators about the meaning of statutory 
text.21 Moreover, in Justice Scalia’s view, judges should not act as quasi-legislators 
concerned with the outcomes resulting from the application of statutory text.22 
Instead, judges should focus on being faithful readers of text in search of the most 
reasonable interpretation of the language that Congress chose to effectuate its policy 
choices.23 Justice Scalia was aware that his philosophy was guaranteed to lead to 
outcomes that may be troubling in particular cases; indeed, he celebrated disfavored 
outcomes as a sign that the judge was faithfully serving his role.24  
                                                      
 
Both originalism and textualism allow judges to claim to be neutral interpreters 
simply following the direction of lawgivers, either the drafters of statutes or the 
Framers of our Constitution. And both theories tend to—and in Scalia’s hands 
certainly did—cast their opponents as unprincipled and partisan activists. It was 
another of Scalia’s successes to create in the public mind an image of a court on 
which originalists tried to maintain fidelity to our founding document and 
everyone else sought to advance their own political agendas. 
 
Kermit Roosevelt, Symposium, supra note 15, at 3. 
18 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 
23 (1997). 
19 Hon. Neil M. Gorsuch, Of Lions and Bears, Judges and Legislators, and the Legacy 
of Justice Scalia, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 906 (2016). 
20 SCALIA, supra note 18, at 38 (“[Hamilton and Madison’s] writings, like those of 
other intelligent and informed people at the time, display how the text of the Constitution 
was originally understood.”). 
21 See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 18, at 17 (focusing on the intent of legislators is “one 
step worse than the trick the emperor Nero was said to engage in: posting edicts high up on 
the pillars, so that they could not easily be read.”). 
22 See, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, Book Review, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 305, 310–11 (2005) 
(reviewing JUDGES IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACY: AN INTERNATIONAL CONVERSATION 
(Robert Badinter & Stephen Breyer eds., 2004)) (contrasting Justice Scalia’s view with one 
in which judges “openly embrace the title of minimally constrained quasi-legislator.”). 
23 SCALIA, supra note 18, at 16–18. 
24 See Gorsuch, supra note 19, at 906 (“As Justice Scalia put it, ‘[i]f you're going to be 
a good and faithful judge, you have to resign yourself to the fact that you’re not always going 
to like the conclusions you reach. If you like them all the time, you're probably doing 
something wrong.’” (quoting Justice Antonin Scalia, Madison Lecture at the Chapman 
University School of Law (Aug. 29, 2005)).  
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Justice Scalia explained in his extrajudicial writings that his textualist 
philosophy contrasts sharply with purposivism, which involves looking beyond the 
text to determine legislative intent.25 As such, Justice Scalia was at the center of a 
debate26 largely of his own making, with many scholars pointing out the flaws in his 
philosophy and arguing that textualists are not, in fact, faithful agents of the 
legislature.27 Most recently, Professor Victoria Nourse has made a strong case that 
minimizing textual ambiguity and ignoring legislative evidence about the meaning 
of statutory text is downright antidemocratic.28 But other scholars have downplayed 
the differences between textualists and purposivists.29  
From this fray has emerged a more nuanced vision of Justice Scalia’s 
philosophy than that presented by Scalia himself, a philosophy which Professor 
Caleb Nelson describes as a “rule-based approach.”30 Professor Nelson also 
downplays the traditional binary that purposivists seek the subjective intent of the 
legislature as evidenced by legislative history, while textualists seek the objective 
                                                      
25 See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 18, at 16–18 (explaining that the belief that judges may 
look past statutory text to determine the intent of the legislature is both a theoretical and 
practical threat to democratic government). 
26 See, e.g., Jane S. Schacter, Text or Consequences?, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1007, 1007 
(2011) (describing Justices Scalia and Breyer as engaged in a “contest over interpretive first 
principles”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 531, 532–33 (2013) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, 
READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012)) (explaining the familiar lines 
of the “big debate” between new textualists like Justice Scalia and pragmatists or 
purposivists). 
27 See generally David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 
67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 921 & n.1 (1992) (noting the overlap in timing between a “sea-
change” in the Supreme Court’s approach to statutory interpretation and a “vast” exploration 
of competing theories in the academic literature). The debate has continued into the current 
decade, with a particularly strong focus on the proper role of legislative history. The debate 
has continued into the current decade, with a particularly strong focus on the proper role of 
legislative history. See, e.g., VICTORIA F. NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, MISREADING 
DEMOCRACY 161–71 (2016) (making a historical and constitutional case for considering 
legislative history); Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from 
the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: 
Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 988–90 (2013) (concluding based on empirical research that 
textualist critiques of legislative history do not stand up to scrutiny).  
28 See NOURSE, supra note 27, at 34–45 (explaining her view that new textualists 
exhibit a “not-so-disguised contempt for Congress”). 
29 See, e.g., ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 55 (2014) (arguing that most 
judges are “neither wholly textualists nor wholly purposivists”); Tushnet, supra note 5, at 
1185 (arguing that the purported debate between Justices Scalia and Breyer was “largely 
theoretical”). But see John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists and Purposivists?, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 75–76 (2006) (noting that although the two doctrines share more 
“conceptual common ground” than their proponents usually admit, the differences are 
nonetheless salient). 
30 Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 372–74 (2005). 
2017] SCALIA’S BANKRUPTCY JURISPRUDENCE 945 
intent of the legislature as evidenced by the statutory language.31 Instead, Nelson 
argues that the textualist approach is guided by a strong commitment to “ruleness.”32 
This “ruleness” has two dimensions: textualists are guided by rules of interpretation 
in applying statutory text,33 and in turn, statutory language is read as an attempt to 
prescribe rules for judges to apply to situations not contemplated by the legislature.34 
Nelson contends that the process is quite similar to purposivism in that both 
approaches involve a degree of “imaginative reconstruction” to determine how a 
legislature might have voted in the particular case pending before the court.35  
This Article adopts the descriptive framework offered by Professor Nelson and 
uses bankruptcy as a lens through which to identify the key features of Justice 
Scalia’s rule-based textualism. This Article further argues that bankruptcy is a 
particularly fruitful forum in which to explore both the implementation and the 
impact of Justice Scalia’s rule-based textualism. Specifically, for the reasons 
explained in Section III below, the modern bankruptcy code gave Justice Scalia an 
uncharted opportunity to implement interpretative methods without constraint from 
intermediate forces. Moreover, for the reasons explained in Section IV below, the 
need for predictability and clarity that rule-based textualism helps fulfill is 
heightened in the bankruptcy field.  
 
III.  THE FRUITFUL FORUM OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 
 
The Bankruptcy Code presents a prime opportunity to evaluate Justice Scalia’s 
approach to statutory interpretation throughout his three decades on the Court for 
two reasons: first, as discussed in Part A, Justice Scalia’s tenure on the Court 
overlapped almost perfectly with the modern bankruptcy era; second, as explained 
in Part B, bankruptcy is an area of the law in which judges have few constraints on 
their approach to statutory interpretation.  
 
A.  1986–2015: A Critical Period for Modern Bankruptcy Law 
 
Appointed to the Supreme Court in 1986, Justice Scalia arrived at almost 
exactly the right time to have maximum impact on bankruptcy law. The modern 
bankruptcy code had recently been entirely revamped through the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978,36 which took effect on October 1, 1979.37 In addition to 
                                                      
31 Id. at 359–60. Nelson suggests that Scalia’s stance against legislative history has 
more to do with constraining judicial decisionmaking than with skepticism of subjective 
intent. Id. at 362–63. 
32 Id. at 373–74.  
33 Id. at 376–77.  
34 Id. at 399–403.  
35 Id. at 403–04. 
36 Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-
1330 (1988)).  
37 U.S.C. § 402(a). Only bankruptcy petitions filed after September 1979 were 
governed by the new version of Title 11 of the United States Code. Id. § 1480(a). 
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changing the substantive law, the Bankruptcy Reform Act changed the judicial 
structure for bankruptcy proceedings and appeals.38 After the Supreme Court 
rejected the 1978 changes as inconsistent with Article III of the Constitution,39 
Congress again revised the structure in the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal 
Judgeship Act of 1984.40 As a result, it took several years for the first cases applying 
the substantive provisions of the 1978 Code to reach the Supreme Court.41  
Thus, by the time Justice Scalia arrived on the Court in fall of 1986, the Court 
had decided only a half dozen cases applying the new bankruptcy law.42 Scalia’s 
                                                      
38 Among other things, the 1978 Act replaced the longstanding system of bankruptcy 
referees with non-Article III judges who would be appointed by the president to hear 
bankruptcy matters. Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 201, 92 Stat. 2549, 2681–82 (1978). This new 
institutional scheme was slated to be phased in as the six-year terms of existing referees 
expired, and was scheduled to become fully effective in April 1984. Id. § 409(a). 
39 See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 88 (1982). The 
Supreme Court stayed its decision twice in order to give Congress time to fix its flawed 
scheme; however, the stay expired at the end of 1982, and bankruptcy judges operated under 
the “Emergency Rule” of the Judicial Conference of the United States until Congress finally 
passed amended statutes in July 1984. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the 
Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 38 (1995). 
40 Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984). 
41 The Supreme Court did not hear any bankruptcy appeals during the 1980–1981 term. 
The first Supreme Court decision directly addressing the 1978 Code was Central Trust Co., 
Rochester, N.Y. v. Official Creditors’ Committee of Geiger Enterprises, Inc., 454 U.S. 354, 
357–58 (1982) (per curiam). This decision did not apply any substantive provisions of the 
new Code, however, because the Court rejected a Chapter 11 debtor’s efforts to dismiss its 
petition under the prior version of the Code and refile under the new version of Chapter 11. 
Id. A seven-Justice majority held that Congress had made clear that cases filed before the 
effective date of the 1978 Act would be governed by the old law. Id. Next came the Supreme 
Court’s bombshell decision in N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 
50 (1982). 
42 After Northern Pipeline, the Supreme Court issued one other procedural decision 
relating to the new Code, concluding that the lien-avoiding provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) 
did not operate retroactively. United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 81–82 (1982). 
The first substantive decision applying the new Code appears to be United States v. Whiting 
Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 211–12 (1983), in which the Court held that as Debtor-in-
Possession, a corporation had authority under 11 U.S.C. § 542 to require the Internal 
Revenue Service to return equipment that it had seized to satisfy a tax lien. After that, the 
Supreme Court issued four more decisions between 1983 and 1986 interpreting or applying 
various provisions of the new code: Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Env. Prot., 
474 U.S. 494, 505–07 (1986) (examining whether a trustee properly exercised its 
abandonment powers under 11 U.S.C. § 554); Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 282–84 (1985) 
(determining that a receiver’s expenses in performing an environmental clean-up on behalf 
of a debtor were dischargeable in bankruptcy); NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 
521–23 (1984) (holding that a collective bargaining agreement was an executory contract 
that a debtor could reject under 11 U.S.C. § 365). This last case provoked public outrage and 
immediate response from Congress. See Dembart & Markell, supra note 12, at 374 
(“Congress quickly stomped on the Court’s ruling and added a new section to the Code to 
address it.”). The Court’s final bankruptcy decision before Justice Scalia’s arrival was 
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first bankruptcy case as a sitting justice was decided in November 1986.43 His first 
opportunity to author a bankruptcy decision came early in his second term, in United 
Savings Association of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd.44 Timbers 
involved a routine but critical question that had divided circuit courts and created 
uncertainty in capital markets.45 Justice Scalia’s seemingly straightforward 
resolution of a difficult problem for which the Code lacked clear answers is viewed 
as one of the all-time heavy hitters of bankruptcy jurisprudence,46 weaving together 
several provisions of the Code to reach a defensible conclusion.47  
Following this prodigious debut, Justice Scalia continued to play an outsized 
role in the development of the Court’s modern bankruptcy jurisprudence. In the five 
years following Justice Scalia’s arrival on the Court, the Court heard twice as many 
bankruptcy cases (sixteen) compared to the five previous terms (eight), with an 
additional nine bankruptcy cases decided in Justice Scalia’s sixth term.48 This uptick 
in bankruptcy cases stands in stark contrast to the overall reduction in the number of 
cases the Supreme Court heard each year, a trend that has also been attributed to 
Justice Scalia.49 According to Professor Steven Calabresi, Justice Scalia “believed 
that the Supreme Court ought to hear fewer cases and do a better job with them than 
it had been doing prior to 1986.”50 It appears that bankruptcy law was one of the 
areas in which Justice Scalia thought the Supreme Court could accomplish this 
                                                      
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 358 (1985) (addressing 
whether a bankruptcy trustee has the authority to waive attorney-client privilege for pre-
petition communications with an entity).  
43 Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 37 (1986). In Kelly, Justice Scalia was part of a 
seven-Justice majority holding that state criminal restitution orders were not dischargeable 
under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7). Id. at 36.  
44 484 U.S. 365, 367, 382 (1988) (holding that undersecured creditors were not entitled 
to post-petition interest). 
45 See, e.g., Thomas J. Salerno et al., Timber’s Impact on Creditors, ADVANCED 
CHAPTER 11 BANKR. PRAC. § 8.92 (2015).  
46 Admittedly unorthodox support for this assertion comes from the fact that Timbers 
was voted into the Weil Bankruptcy Blog’s “Final Four” all-time greatest Supreme Court 
bankruptcy decisions. See March Madness: The Weil Bankruptcy Blog’s Final Four, WEIL 
BANKR. BLOG (Mar. 30, 2011), http://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com/survey/march 
-madness-the-weil-bankruptcy-blog%e2%80%99s-final-four/ [https://perma.cc/XV9V-
D9KZ]. More orthodox support comes from a former bankruptcy judge, who describes 
Timbers as the watershed case for adequate protection law. Dembart & Markell, supra note 
12, at 382. 
47 For a more thorough discussion of Timbers, see infra Section V. 
48 Charles Jordan Tabb & Robert M. Lawless, Of Commas, Gerunds, and Conjunctions: 
The Bankruptcy Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 823, 823–25 
(1991). 
49 See Steven G. Calabresi, The Unknown Achievements of Justice Scalia, 39 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 575, 575 (2016) (noting that Justice Scalia played “a key role in 
persuading the Justices to stop hearing and deciding 150 decisions a year and to aim at only 
80 decisions a year instead.”).  
50 Id. 
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mission. Through the 2014–15 term, the Supreme Court decided a total of eighty-
six cases arising under the modern version of Title 11 of the United States Code.51 
Justice Scalia wrote in twenty-five of these cases, including seven unanimous 
opinions, four majority opinions, nine concurrences, and five dissents.52 
These numbers suggest that Justice Scalia played an outsized role in the 
development of modern bankruptcy law. Indeed, up until his death in February 2015, 
Justice Scalia wrote in more cases interpreting the modern bankruptcy code than any 
other justice.53 In terms of sheer volume, he was closely followed by Justice Stevens 
writing in twenty-four cases and Justice Thomas writing in twenty-two.54 The drop-
off after that is stark, with Ginsburg writing in a total of ten bankruptcy cases through 
2015, and Souter, Rehnquist, and Blackmun each writing in nine cases.55 
Looking solely at lead opinions, only Justice Thomas wrote more lead opinions 
than Justice Scalia, with a total of thirteen (eight unanimous decisions and five 
                                                      
51 See infra Appendix A. This list comes from a combination of two sources. This list 
started with a Westlaw search for all Supreme Court decisions that reference “bankruptcy” 
or Title 11 of the United States Code. However, this generates some false positives because 
some decisions only cite the Bankruptcy Code as an illustration. See, e.g., Rose v. Rose, 481 
U.S. 619, 637 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (pointing to the non-dischargeability of 
child support obligations as an example of the special status that these obligations are 
traditionally accorded). Nonetheless, this search was used to identify Justice Scalia’s 
bankruptcy-related writings. This list was then compared to the very helpful Appendix in 
Karen Gebbia’s recent article analyzing the Supreme Court’s patterns of granting certiorari 
in bankruptcy cases. Gebbia, supra note 11, at 580–83. There was not complete overlap 
between the two sources, which suggests that the total number of “bankruptcy cases” varies 
depending on the extent to which a reader subjectively believes that a particular decision 
implicates bankruptcy law or practice. The count errs on the side of inclusion. See, e.g., 
Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 715 (1995) (holding that the general criminal statute 
penalizing false statements to the government did not apply to bankruptcy filings); U.S. 
Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 24–29 (1994) (case in which the 
Court granted certiorari on a bankruptcy question but ended up issuing a procedural decision 
declining to grant the creditor the remedy of vacatur when the parties settled after certiorari 
was granted); Dep’t of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 773 (1994) 
(reviewing a bankruptcy judge’s ruling on an objection to a state’s claim for a civil forfeiture 
claim that based on the Double Jeopardy clause). Each of these decisions involved choices 
that impacted bankruptcy practice.  
52 See infra Appendix B. 
53 See infra Appendix B.  
54 See infra Appendix B. In the year since Justice Scalia’s death, Justice Thomas has 
written in three more bankruptcy cases, bringing his total to twenty-five. Czyzewski v. Jevic 
Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 987 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Puerto Rico v. Franklin 
Calif. Tax Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1942 (2016) (majority opinion); Husky Int’l Elecs., 
Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1590 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
55 See infra Appendix B. Justice Sotomayor appears poised to join the leader board, 
having written in five cases during her first five years on the Court. In the short period since 
Scalia’s death, she has written in two more bankruptcy cases: a dissent in Puerto Rico, 136 
S. Ct. at 1049, and a majority decision in Husky, 136 S. Ct. at 1585.  
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majority opinions).56 These two justices alone wrote more lead opinions than the 
next three justices combined: Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens, who each 
wrote seven lead opinions in bankruptcy cases.57 Altogether, these five justices 
wrote fourty-five lead opinions, just over half of the total number of Supreme Court 
decisions in the modern bankruptcy era. Fourteen different justices wrote the 
remaining forty-one bankruptcy decisions. Several current justices are at the very 
low end of this range, including Justices Kennedy and Kagan, who each wrote one 
majority opinion during the relevant time period, followed by Justices Roberts, 
Alito, and Breyer, who each wrote two.58 
Having shown that Justice Scalia was one of the most active and impactful 
justices for modern bankruptcy law, Part B now turns to why this field presented 
Justice Scalia with so many opportunities to refine and implement his brand of rule-
based textualism. 
 
B.  Modern Bankruptcy Law Creates Unique Statutory Interpretation Questions 
 
A critical aspect of bankruptcy law that is different from ordinary practice is its 
laser-like focus on questions of statutory interpretation.59 Statutory interpretation 
questions are common in the Supreme Court, as they arise with any type of 
legislation.60 However, particularly since the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 
bankruptcy is an area in which the Supreme Court has had frequent opportunity to 
address the meaning of statutory language de novo, with the full range of interpretive 
tools available to it.61  
Indeed, the Code stands out as one of the few areas of modern federal law where 
the parties to litigation have virtually free rein to argue about the meaning of 
particular statutory provisions, at least until the Supreme Court has spoken 
authoritatively.62 Unlike bankruptcy legislation, much of federal legislation is 
                                                      
56 See infra Appendix B. In addition to these thirteen opinions, Justice Thomas also 
wrote the majority opinion in Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1942. 
57 See infra Appendix B.  
58 See infra Appendix B. In the 2016–2017 Term, Justice Breyer wrote two more 
majority opinions: Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 978, and Midland Funding LLC v. 
Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407, 1411 (2017). His analysis in Jevic draws on several of Justice 
Scalia’s blockbuster bankruptcy decisions. See Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 985 (citing 
United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 
(1988)); id. at 987 (citing RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 
639, 649 (2012)); id. (citing Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188, 1198 (2014)).  
59 See Rendell, supra note 1, at 887 (“[T]he Code is intricate, complicated and, in 
certain portions, hopelessly ambiguous” with recent amendments that “created new puzzles 
for lawyers and judges.”). 
60 KATZMANN, supra note 29, at 3 (noting that the Supreme Court’s docket contains a 
substantial number of statutory cases, including almost two-thirds of its cases in a recent 
term). 
61 See Dembart & Markell, supra note 12, at 373. 
62 Five years into Scalia’s tenure, a 1991 article noted the huge uptick in bankruptcy 
cases taken by the Supreme Court to address seemingly mundane statutory interpretation 
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subject either to agency interpretation63 or, in the case of criminal statutes, to rules 
of construction that limit ambiguity.64 These intermediate forces in turn have a 
filtering effect and limit the tools that ordinary litigants or parties can use to argue 
for their preferred outcome.  
In the agency context, courts apply interpretive doctrines such as the Chevron 
doctrine, which states that courts should first look to whether the intent of Congress 
is clear.65 If it is not, then the court should determine whether the agency’s 
interpretation is a “permissible construction of the statute.”66 This means that in most 
cases where Congress has not directly spoken to the precise issue, courts are merely 
evaluating the construction that the agency has chosen and determining whether it 
is permissible.67 Such analysis looks very different from the analysis a court might 
undertake in the first instance to determine the meaning of a statute. In the former 
situation, agency deference means that a court will uphold the agency’s 
interpretation of a statute if it accords with generally recognized tools of 
construction. In essence, defending the agency’s reading depends on identifying 
tools of construction that support that reading, and then arguing over their 
reasonableness. Moreover, the notion that the agency may be making policy choices 
does not undermine its preferred readings, because an agency is seen as part of the 
executive branch.68 
In contrast, bankruptcy law does not involve any intermediate agency tasked 
with interpreting the Code.69 Instead, it is up to the parties in individual cases to 
                                                      
questions. Tabb & Lawless, supra note 48, at 824.  
63 Daniel A. Austin, Bankruptcy and the Myth of “Uniform Laws,” 42 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1081, 1085 (2012); see also KATZMANN, supra note 29, at 23 (arguing that in enacting 
statutory commands, Congress is usually communicating with agencies and not courts). 
64 See, e.g., Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (“[T]he terms of a 
penal statute . . . must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what 
conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties . . . .”). 
65 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
More recent decisions have muddied the issue of the appropriate agency deference. See 
generally Catherine M. Sharkey, In the Wake of Chevron’s Retreat, (U. Wis. Law School’s 
Ideas and Innovations Series, Working Paper, Sept. 28, 2016) (discussing the potential future 
application of the Chevron doctrine). This Article takes no position on the continued viability 
of Chevron deference except to suggest that agency interpretations will always play at least 
some threshold role in shaping how courts view questions of statutory interpretation, even if 
the agency interpretation is rejected. 
66 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
67 Id. According to one scholar, Scalia was the high court’s “most consistent proponent” 
of the Chevron approach. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Justice Scalia’s Unparalleled Contributions 
to Administrative Law, 101 MINN. L. REV. 66, 69–71 (2016). 
68 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66. 
69 As Judge Bruce Markell and his law clerk Lee Dembart have observed, in many other 
areas of federal law “there are entire executive agencies whose job it is to implement the will 
of Congress and turn congressional enactments into a consistent and coherent code.” 
Dembart & Markell, supra note 12, at 373. Interestingly, the early planning stages for 
bankruptcy reform involved a proposal to create a bankruptcy agency within the executive 
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make whatever arguments they believe best support their preferred reading of the 
statute. If the full range of interpretive tools is available, then one would expect 
parties to pick and choose the tools that best suit their preferred outcomes, and ignore 
other tools that might be a better fit for objective interpretation.70 In turn, the task of 
interpreting the Code becomes far more open ended, and issues may be revisited 
repeatedly under different methods of interpretation, depending on the particular 
arguments that have been made in past cases.71 At least according to Justice Scalia, 
the lack of any clear structure enables judicial power grabs72 and risks unprincipled 
distortions in the development of the law.73 Accordingly, to the extent that one 
believes that judicial power should be constrained in some objective manner, rule-
based textualism serves as one method of constraint.74 Moreover, as discussed in 
                                                      
branch that would be tasked with counseling and giving guidance to consumers. Eric A. 
Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 MICH. L. REV. 47, 
68–69 (1997). Plans for an executive agency were fiercely opposed by bankruptcy judges, 
who objected to the likely diminution of their powers. Id. at 69. Lawyers also universally 
opposed the creation of such an agency, on the theory that it would take away business and 
reduce their stature. Id. at 83–84. The eventual law reflected a compromise by creating a 
pilot program that would eventually become the U.S. Trustee Program, which operates as a 
unit within the Department of Justice. Id. at 90. However, Posner argues that beyond 
overseeing the appointment and conduct of private trustees, the U.S. Trustee system plays 
little discernable role in shaping bankruptcy law. Id. at 124.  
70 Scalia and Garner describe this as a process of “eisegesis,” in which ideas about what 
the text should mean become more important than the text itself, instead of a more principled 
process of “exegesis,” in which the court endeavors to fairly determine what the text says, 
without regard for outcome. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 10 (2012). 
71 Id. For one recent example, compare Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 66–75 (1995) with 
Husky International Electronics, Inc., v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1586–88 (2016). In both cases, 
the Court was attempting to determine the meaning of the words “actual fraud” as set forth 
in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). But in each decision, the majority used very different tools to 
interpret this phrase. In Field, the Court relied on sources contemporaneous with the 1978 
Code, including modern treatises and twentieth century case law from state courts. In Husky, 
the Court approached the same language using a Supreme Court decision from 1877, along 
with nineteenth century treatises, plus English statutes and case law dating back to the 
sixteenth century. The Husky decision was argued and decided in the months following 
Scalia’s death, but it is fascinating to ponder how Scalia might have handled that seemingly 
radical departure in interpretive strategy. 
72 SCALIA, supra note 18, at 29. 
73 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 70, at 5–6. 
74 See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 148 (1991) (arguing 
that decisionmaking is more efficient when decision-makers’ discretion is limited); see also 
id. at 158 (discussing how rules may represent “withdrawals of decisional jurisdiction . . . .”). 
However, this view has been criticized as overly simplistic. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus 
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 588–89 (1992); Baird, supra note 6, 
at 594–95 (contrasting the proceduralist view of bankruptcy, which endorses constraints, 
with the traditionalist view, which sees unfettered discretion as a better way to promote the 
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Section IV below, the benefits of “ruleness” are particularly clear in the bankruptcy 
context, due to the special nature of this practice. 
 
IV.  THE HEIGHTENED IMPORTANCE OF CLARITY AND PREDICTABILITY IN 
BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE 
 
This Section argues that Justice Scalia’s rule-based textualism was a 
particularly good fit for bankruptcy law. Justice Scalia believed that his textualist 
philosophy promoted certainty and predictability.75 Indeed, his treatise on statutory 
interpretation begins with a foreword authored by Judge Frank Easterbrook 
explaining why a rule-based approach to statutory interpretation is cost-effective.76  
As Judge Easterbrook notes, litigation is expensive, and “no one but a zealot or 
madman throws good money after bad by taking a pointless appeal or filing a 
doomed petition for certiorari.”77 Thus, when it comes to statutory interpretation, 
consistency is efficient: if the losing party in civil litigation is confident that the 
judges on appeal will evaluate the issue the same way that the lower court did, there 
is less incentive to pursue appeals.78 In contrast, if there is no standardized way in 
which courts are likely to evaluate an issue, a litigant may be more willing to roll 
the dice on the theory that a higher court will see the issue differently.79 Throughout 
his career, Justice Scalia advocated for rules that would “narrow the range of 
acceptable judicial decision-making” and, in turn, narrow the range of issues that are 
worth arguing about and litigating.80 Above all else, he sought to minimize the 
culture of “give-it-a-try litigation,” 81 which he saw as wasteful.82 
Justice Scalia’s normative claim about the benefits of rule-based textualism is 
the subject of many great debates in academic literature.83 This is a question that 
may lack definite answers because, as Professor Nelson points out, there will always 
be costs and benefits to rule-based textualism.84 Accordingly, the proper 
                                                      
purposes of Title 11).  
75 See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 18, at 28 (explaining that artificial rules of interpretation 
diminish uniformity and objectivity and promote unpredictability and even arbitrariness); id. 
at 36 (arguing that the use of legislative history only increases these problems).  
76 Hon. Frank Easterbrook, Foreword to ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, 
READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS, at xxi–xxvi (2012). 
77 Id. at xxiv. 
78 Id. at xxiv–xxv. 
79 Id. at xxv. 
80 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 70, at xxviii. 
81 Id. at 6. 
82 Id. at 6–7. 
83 See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 74, at 559 & n.1 (surveying the literature on the 
economic analysis of rules versus standards); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 34–47 (1994) (contrasting Scalia’s brand of textualism with 
other approaches to statutory interpretation); John F. Manning, Textualism as a 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 684–88 (1997) (tracing the legal realist 
roots of Justice Scalia’s textualism and contrasting it with positivism). 
84 Nelson, supra note 30, at 398–99. 
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philosophical approach to statutory text may depend on the area in which Congress 
is legislating.85 This Article does not seek to resolve this debate. Instead, this Article 
shows how the idiosyncracies of bankruptcy practice amplify the arguments in favor 
of a rule-based approach.  
Drawing on the work of Professor Frederick Schauer, this section argues that 
bankruptcy is an area of law in which rules may be particularly beneficial. According 
to Professor Schauer, “reliance” is a key value in shaping effective rules.86 
Specifically, reliance allows actors to plan effectively based on predictions about 
how rules will be enforced in the future.87 Professor Schauer posits that “ruleness” 
promotes reliance in three ways that are significant to evaluating the impact of 
Justice Scalia’s rule-based textualism on bankruptcy practice. First, by “the 
simplifying properties of rule-based decisionmaking,”88 ruleness enhances 
predictability.89 Second, ruleness decreases the possibility of variation in 
decisionmaking, thereby reducing the range of possible outcomes.90 Third, ruleness 
has an efficiency component in that clear rules do not require judges to invest as 
much time resolving disputes, thereby promoting judicial economy.91  
Accepting as true Professor Schauer’s claim that ruleness promotes reliance, 
this Section explains why rule-based textualism is particularly advantageous for the 
bankruptcy field.92 Bankruptcy differs from most ordinary litigation in two 
important ways. First, as explained above in Section III.B, bankruptcy is a code-
based practice area, with no intermediate agency to interpret Congressional statutes 
and no other overarching doctrines that channel courts’ interpretation of statutes. 
Thus, bankruptcy is an area in which lower courts frequently address statutory 
interpretation questions free from any external constraints, other than the constraints 
imposed by rule-based textualism. Second, as explained below, clear and predictable 
rules are particularly important in the bankruptcy context. Part A explains the 
importance of predictability ex post, given the inefficient nature of bankruptcy 
litigation, while Part B explains the importance of predictability ex ante, given the 
central role bankruptcy law plays in commercial markets. 
                                                      
85 Id. at 399–400. 
86 SCHAUER, supra note 74, at 137–40.  
87 Id. at 139–40. 
88 Id. at 139. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 144–45. 
91 Id. at 146–48. 
92 This is a controversial assumption, particularly in the bankruptcy field, where some 
have argued that specialist judges are better equipped to ensure the correct outcome on a case 
by case basis. See, e.g., Baird, supra note 6, at 594–95 (explaining that the traditionalist view 
of bankruptcy sees the process as an ad hoc balancing of interests best performed by the 
specialist judges of the bankruptcy courts with few constraints on their discretion). However, 
the ideals of the traditionalist view cannot be fully realized so long as bankruptcy courts’ 
statutory interpretation decisions are subject to de novo review by appellate courts. Thus, 
even if one subscribes to the traditionalist ideal, there is still room to appreciate the role of 
clarity and predictability on appeal.  
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A.  Litigation Incentives Are Different 
 
Like all civil litigation, bankruptcy law depends on the adversarial process to 
identify disputes and advocate for particular interpretations of statutory language.93 
But unlike civil litigation, which typically features a plaintiff and a defendant who 
are directly and unequivocally adverse, bankruptcy proceedings do not always have 
clearly defined adversaries. Rather, bankruptcies are better understood as collective 
actions that involve overlapping and sometimes parallel interests.94  
Understanding the role of various players is important to understanding the 
unique dynamics of the collective action of a bankruptcy case. There is always a 
debtor, who is typically the party that has initiated the bankruptcy process.95 And 
there are always creditors, typically in large numbers, who understand that the 
debtor’s bankruptcy filing means that the debtor lacks sufficient assets or income to 
be able to pay those creditors in full.96 Although most creditors would likely be 
considered adverse to a debtor outside of bankruptcy, this conception of adversity 
may change once a debtor has filed a petition. At that point, creditors no longer have 
any ability to take steps toward collection without the express approval of the 
bankruptcy court,97 and their future actions may be permanently curtailed by the 
discharge that the debtor receives.98  
Whether creditors can fairly be considered adverse to the debtor during a 
bankruptcy proceeding depends on a wide range of factors.99 For example, secured 
creditors will typically maintain a security interest in an underlying asset 
notwithstanding the bankruptcy filing. For them, bankruptcy resolves how much the 
asset is worth, which in turn influences how much the secured creditor will 
                                                      
93 See, e.g., Gorsuch, supra note 19, at 910 (“[Judicial] power [is] constrained by its 
dependence on the adversarial system to identify the issues and arguments for 
decision . . . .”). 
94 See Posner, supra note 69, at 50; see also Lawrence Ponoroff, Constitutional 
Limitations on State-Enacted Bankruptcy Exemption Legislation and the Long Overdue Case 
for Uniformity, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 353, 356 (2014) (unlike state debtor-creditor law, which 
is concerned with outcomes as between two parties, federal bankruptcy law is “a 
collectivized debt collection process”). 
95 The exception is an involuntary bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2016). Notably, 
many involuntary bankruptcies end up looking similar to voluntary bankruptcies once the 
debtor realizes that bankruptcy is unavoidable and may represent the optimal outcome.  
96 Specifically, debtors file Schedules D, E, and F listing their creditors. See U.S. 
COURTS, BANKRUPTCY FORMS B 106D–106F, http://www.uscourts.gov/forms/bankruptcy-
forms [https://perma.cc/UVP5-CE39]. Based on these lists, creditors receive notices from 
the court notifying them of the bankruptcy and critical deadlines. See U.S. COURTS, 
BANKRUPTCY FORMS B 309A–309I, http://www.uscourts.gov/forms/bankruptcy-forms 
[https://perma.cc/UVP5-CE39]. 
97 See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2016) (describing the automatic stay). 
98 See id. § 524 (describing the injunctive feature of the discharge). 
99 See Posner, supra note 69, at 55–56 (explaining that although creditors as a group 
have many similar interests, they tend to have divergent interests regarding the costs and 
procedural protections in bankruptcy law). 
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ultimately be paid and when the secured creditor can expect payments. Creditors 
with nondischargeable debt may be able to sit on the sidelines for the entire 
bankruptcy proceeding, with the assurance that they will be able to continue to make 
collection efforts after the bankruptcy (though usually without any assurance that 
those efforts will be any more successful after bankruptcy than they were before 
bankruptcy). And priority creditors can expect to move to the front of the line and 
be paid ahead of most other creditors (though that boost is meaningless if a debtor 
lacks sufficient assets to pay any creditors).100 These creditors may want the debtor 
to get through bankruptcy as quickly as possible, while expending as few resources 
as possible.  
In contrast to these categories of creditors who often have some hope of 
eventual recovery, the vast majority of creditors fall into the category of unsecured, 
nonpriority creditors who are facing discharge of their debt. For these creditors, 
bankruptcy is truly a zero-sum game. They likely have limited prospects for recovery 
in the first instance, and any money or resources that they spend litigating issues will 
reduce their bottom line recovery. These creditors are typically not adverse to the 
debtor, at least in the way that we normally conceive of parties to litigation. 
Due in part to this collective action problem, bankruptcy has a special actor—
the trustee—whose role often aligns with both debtor and creditor interests. 
Although the trustee’s function varies depending on the particular chapter of the 
bankruptcy code, the trustee’s role can be seen as ensuring that the debtor is in the 
best position to maximize the payout to all of the creditors. In Chapter 7 (and to a 
lesser extent in Chapter 11),101 this often means recovering assets that can be used 
to pay off creditors. Thus, for example, the trustee can proceed against third parties 
in order to recover assets and administer them in a way that benefits all the parties 
to the proceeding (at least in theory). Although the trustee sometimes operates in 
ways that appear adverse to the debtor, the relationship is not always truly adverse: 
sometimes the trustee’s actions benefit the debtor,102 while other times the debtor is 
neutral as to the outcome.103  
                                                      
100 Having priority does not help a creditor in most Chapter 7 cases, as almost 90% of 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy filings are considered “no asset,” meaning that the debtor has no non-
exempt assets that are available to be liquidated for the benefit of any creditors. See 
Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L ASS’N OF BANKR. TR., https://www.nabt.com/faq.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/3M7X-C9M8]. 
101 In Chapter 11, the filing entity can exercise most of the rights and powers of a 
Trustee as a “debtor in possession.” 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (2016). However, a Trustee may be 
appointed in extreme cases, such as businesses that are accused of fraud or gross 
mismanagement. See id. § 1104 (2016).  
102 For example, a Trustee may seek to invalidate a lien that enables the debtor to claim 
exempt equity, pay non-dischargeable priority debt, or (in the case of a Chapter 11 Debtor) 
retain productive business assets. See In re Wind Power Systems, Inc., 841 F.2d 288, 290–
91 (9th Cir. 1988). 
103 One such example is a proceeding under 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2016), when the Trustee 
recovers a preferential transfer that favors one creditor at the expense of others. See, e.g., In 
re Sterry Indus., Inc., 553 B.R. 96, 99–102 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2016) (analyzing whether a 
pool company’s payments to a subcontractor were preferential transfers that the Trustee 
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Moreover, to the extent that creditors have any hope of getting paid, they prefer 
that the debtor conserve its resources. As a result, they are less likely to view 
adversarial actions against the debtor as a positive development, since any litigation 
will drain the debtor’s already taxed resources.104 In simple terms, any money that 
the debtor spends litigating an issue is money that the creditors will not be able to 
collect from in order to pay their debts.105 This is particularly true in Chapter 11 and 
Chapter 13 cases, where a debtor’s ability to repay creditors depends on the success 
of the debtor’s plan. Creditors who expect to be paid through the plan are aligned 
with the debtor to the extent that they want to see the plan succeed—or, if the plan 
is going to fail, they prefer that it fail quickly, with as little litigation as possible.  
Along these lines, any attempt by one creditor to obtain an advantage typically 
harms other creditors, with the consequence that creditors may often end up adverse 
not only to the debtor as a matter of form, but also to each other as a practical matter. 
For example, a creditor may file an adversary proceeding against the debtor in an 
effort to have that particular creditor’s debt declared nondischargeable.106 The 
caption for such a proceeding would be “Creditor v. Debtor,” but the creditor is also 
seeking to elevate itself relative to other creditors. In addition, whether the creditor 
wins or loses the adversary proceeding, the creditor is forcing the debtor to expend 
resources litigating the matter, which will directly harm the expected recovery of all 
other creditors.  
Given the unique dynamics of the bankruptcy system, having clear rules that 
govern the outcome of litigation is beneficial to all stakeholders.107 When the parties 
can predict ahead of time what the result will be, the parties are less likely to spend 
time and resources litigating over particular issues.108 In turn, decreased litigation 
improves overall outcomes because it preserves debtor resources and ensures the 
maximum overall payout to all creditors.109 
                                                      
could avoid). If all Creditors have dischargeable debt, or if the debtor is dissolving a business 
in Chapter 7, the debtor may be neutral as to who loses and who benefits from the avoidance 
action. 
104 In fact, some commentators have described bankruptcy proceedings as a rent-
seeking process in which powerful and well-organized creditors are constantly trying to 
shape court doctrine in order to extract value from passive creditors. See generally Mark J. 
Roe & Frederick Tung, Breaking Bankruptcy Priority: How Rent-Seeking Upends the 
Creditors’ Bargain, 99 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1242 (2013) (explaining that powerful creditors 
“can react quickly and shift losses to less nimble creditors”). 
105 See Waldron & Berman, supra note 12, at 213 (stating that, in bankruptcy 
proceedings, “every dollar applied to costs and fees . . . is a dollar not available for 
distribution to creditors”). 
106 See, e.g., Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1585–86 (2016) 
(illustrating that vendor-creditor petitioned to have its debt declared non-dischargeable under 
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) due to alleged fraud by the debtor). 
107 See Kaplow, supra note 74, at 609–10 (noting that courts’ reliance on the adversary 
process may result in poor decisionmaking, which in turn may favor rules over standards). 
108 Easterbrook, supra note 76, at xxiv. 
109 See Waldron & Berman, supra note 12, at 213 (explaining that consistent 
approaches to statutory interpretation improve predictability and maximize creditor 
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The same efficiency arguments apply to bankruptcy appeals. As noted above, 
when there are no clear rules governing courts’ approach to statutory questions, a 
party that was on the losing side before a lower court is more likely to roll the dice 
on appeal to a higher court.110 This risk of inefficient appeals is amplified in 
bankruptcy, where the district court (or, in some circuits, a bankruptcy appellate 
panel111) provides an added layer of appeal between the bankruptcy court and the 
circuit court of appeals.112 This extra layer imposes additional costs for the 
stakeholders in bankruptcy.113 Moreover, this extra layer of appeal comes without 
the normal benefit of providing clarity in the law, as only a court of appeals decision 
would have any precedential effect.114 But the resources expended in taking an 
appeal to the district court in turn make it less likely that a party will pursue an appeal 
to the circuit court, further weakening the efficiency of the system as a whole.115  
 
B.  Bankruptcy Law Impacts Commercial Markets 
 
In addition to the ex post benefits of predictability for stakeholders in the 
bankruptcy process, there is also a strong argument that predictability in bankruptcy 
law has ex ante benefits. Several commentators have taken arguments about the need 
for clarity in bankruptcy a step further, by arguing that clarity promotes a wide range 
of ex ante efficiency interests.116 For example, Professor Daniel Austin argued that 
                                                      
recoveries). 
110 Easterbrook, supra note 76, at xxiv–xxv. 
111 Some circuits have established Bankruptcy Appellate Panels (“BAPs”) under 
28 U.S.C. § 158(b). These panels are composed of three bankruptcy judges and, with party 
consent, may hear appeals instead of the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 158(c). As of 2016, a 
total of five circuits used BAPs: the 1st, 6th, 8th, 9th, and 10th Circuits. See U.S. COURTS, 
TABLE BAP-1—U.S. BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANELS JUDICIAL BUSINESS (Sept. 30, 
2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/bap-1/judicial-business/2016/09/30 
[https://perma.cc/Q9H3-SXGM].  
112 See Hon. Leif M. Clark, On Promoting “Uniform Laws Respecting Bankruptcy,” 
AM. BANKR. INST. J., Aug. 2002, at 32, 32. Although a bankruptcy court can use 
28 U.S.C. § 158(d) to certify questions of first impression for direct appeal to a circuit court, 
the circuits do not often agree to take these appeals. DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY: 
DEALING WITH FINANCIAL FAILURE FOR INDIVIDUALS AND BUSINESSES 591 (4th ed. 2015). 
113 Clark, supra note 112, at 32. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. Judge Clark argues that bypassing the district court and allowing direct appeals 
to circuit courts would promote greater uniformity and reduce transaction costs in 
commercial markets. Id. Similarly, Eric Posner has noted that the extra layer of appeal is 
unnecessary and likely an inefficient byproduct of Article III judges’ efforts to ensure that 
their power and prestige was not diluted by the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act. Posner, supra 
note 69, at 123–24. 
116 See, e.g., Austin, supra note 63, at 1135–37 (arguing that uniformity in bankruptcy 
laws promotes both “efficiency in contractual relations” and “judicial efficiency”); see also 
Clark, supra note 112, at 32 (explaining that differences in local approaches to bankruptcy 
impose transactional costs on national lenders that are “both frustrating and expensive.”). 
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just as contract law drives parties’ expectations in commercial relationships, 
bankruptcy law also creates a backdrop for modern transactions.117 Professors David 
Skeel and Thomas Jackson argued that transaction consistency in bankruptcy 
outcomes is essential to financial markets.118 Relatedly, Professors Lynn Lopucki 
and Joseph Doherty have identified a variety of efficiency interests in being able to 
accurately predict the outcome of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy.119 To the extent that 
efficiency is linked to predictability, the benefit of rule-based textualism is 
heightened.120  
Clear outcomes under the Code are essential because they “facilitate 
transparency and predictability in financial relations.”121 This argument finds further 
support in constitutional text, with many commentators arguing that the framers’ use 
of the word “uniform” in Article I’s bankruptcy clause may call for more consistent 
outcomes.122 Even critics of general calls for uniformity in law as detrimental to state 
interests have endorsed the need for uniformity in bankruptcy based on the plain 
language of the Constitution.123 In sum, a wide array of voices support the need for 
clarity and predictability in bankruptcy law.  
For these reasons, rule-based textualism appears to be a particularly good fit 
for bankruptcy law. When judges apply clear and uncomplicated rules, the outcomes 
are more predictable.124 And when all judges can be expected to follow these same 
                                                      
117 Austin, supra note 63, at 1135–36. 
118 See generally David A. Skeel, Jr. & Thomas H. Jackson, Transaction Consistency 
and the New Finance in Bankruptcy, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 152, 162–68 (2012) (using 
evidence from the financial crisis of 2008 to argue that the application of predictable 
bankruptcy principles to complex financial transactions would have limited the economic 
damage); see also Thomas H. Jackson & David A. Skeel, Jr., Dynamic Resolution of Large 
Financial Institutions, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 435, 447–48 (2012) (arguing that the 
transparency and clear rules offered by bankruptcy “enhance credit market efficiency”). 
119 See Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Survival, 62 UCLA L. 
REV. 970, 974 (2015) (finding that the experience of the bankruptcy judge is a key factor in 
whether a business will be able to emerge from Chapter 11 successfully).  
120 See SCHAUER, supra note 74, at 139, 146–48. 
121 Austin, supra note 63, at 1137. 
122 See id. at 1083–86; Judith Schenck Koffler, The Bankruptcy Clause and Exemption 
Laws: A Reexamination of the Doctrine of Geographic Uniformity, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 22, 
58–59 (1983); Ponoroff, supra note 94, at 384 (arguing that the Framers’ choice of the word 
“uniform” in Article I’s bankruptcy clause calls for clear outcomes that discourage forum-
shopping). For competing views on the impact of forum shopping, compare LYNN M. 
LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE 
BANKRUPTCY COURTS 137–40 (2005) (identifying seven negative outcomes caused by the 
competition for bankruptcy filings) with Todd J. Zywicki, Is Forum Shopping Corrupting 
America’s Bankruptcy Courts?, 94 GEO. L.J. 1141, 1184–85 (2006) (reviewing Courting 
Failure and contrasting it with the theory that competition for bankruptcy business is a “race 
to the top”). 
123 See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1620 (2008). 
124 SCHAUER, supra note 74, at 139–40. 
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clear and uncomplicated rules, the amount of litigation and appeals is reduced.125 
This vision of ruleness makes bankruptcy proceedings less expensive and more 
efficient for all stakeholders, while the reliance promoted by predictability in 
outcomes may benefit commercial transactions. Section V explores Justice Scalia’s 
commitment to rule-based textualism and identifies the key aspects of his rule-based 
textualism that furthered the efficiency interests identified in this Section. 
 
V.  JUSTICE SCALIA’S PHILOSOPHY IN BANKRUPTCY CASES 
 
As the preceding Sections explain, Justice Scalia’s approach to statutory 
interpretation has been described as “rule-based textualism” which may promote 
efficiency. This Section demonstrates the ways in which Justice Scalia’s bankruptcy 
writings fulfilled this ideal, identifying four specific features of his rule-based 
textualism that helped promote clarity and predictability.  
At the outset, it is apparent from Justice Scalia’s bankruptcy writings that he 
understood the Supreme Court’s critical role in encouraging clarity and 
predictability in bankruptcy law. For example, Justice Scalia clearly articulated this 
vision in his majority decision in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated 
Bank:126 “The Bankruptcy Code standardizes an expansive (and sometimes unruly) 
area of law, and it is our obligation to interpret the Code clearly and predictably 
using well established principles of statutory construction.”127 
Perhaps equally often, however, Justice Scalia was making his pitch for clarity 
and predictability in dissent or concurrence, criticizing the majority opinion for 
unnecessarily complicating the text of the Code with extraneous factors. For 
example, when a five-justice majority balked at the possibility that a particular 
provision of the revised 1978 Code would irreparably alter the home mortgage 
market,128 Justice Scalia argued that the majority’s distortion of the statutory text 
posed far greater consequences: 
 
By disregarding well-established and oft-repeated principles of statutory 
construction, [the Court] renders those principles less secure, and the 
certainty they are designed to achieve less attainable. When a seemingly 
clear provision can be pronounced “ambiguous” sans textual and 
structural analysis, and when the assumption of uniform meaning is 
replaced by “one-subsection-at-a-time” interpretation, innumerable 
statutory texts become worth litigating. In the bankruptcy field alone, for 
example, unfortunate future litigants will have to pay the price . . . .129 
                                                      
125 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 70, at xxiv–xxv. 
126 566 U.S. 639 (2012). 
127 Id. at 649. 
128 See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 416–18 (1992) (refusing to reduce a lien on 
property to the present value of the real estate despite the clear statutory command of 11 
U.S.C. § 522, on the theory that Congress could not possibly have intended such a dramatic 
change to the home mortgage market). 
129 Id. at 435–36. For a thorough discussion of Dewnsup, see infra Section V.B.  
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A review of Justice Scalia’s bankruptcy writing reveals four features of his 
rule-based effort to bring clarity and predictability to bankruptcy law. First, Justice 
Scalia employed a holistic approach to the Code, drawing on seemingly disparate 
provisions in an attempt to discern an objective legislative intent. Second, Justice 
Scalia’s bankruptcy writings reveal an almost Kantian approach to statutory 
interpretation: choosing what he believed to be the fairest reading of statutory text, 
regardless of the consequences. Third, Scalia frequently criticized the use of 
legislative history and often refused to join any portion of a decision that considered 
such materials in an attempt to discern subjective legislative intent. Fourth, Scalia 
sought to simplify jurisdictional and decisional rules that would make it easier to 
determine the scope of a bankruptcy court’s judicial authority. Each of these features 
of Scalia’s rule-based textualism is discussed below, with examples.  
 
A.  A Holistic Approach to the Bankruptcy Code 
 
The first marker of Justice Scalia’s rule-based textualism is his holistic 
approach to the text of the Bankruptcy Code. One of the most prominent examples 
is his unanimous decision in United Savings Association of Texas v. Timbers of 
Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd.130 In Timbers, the Court sought to answer a recurring 
question that appeared to lack any clear answer in the Code: is an undersecured 
creditor (i.e. a creditor whose collateral is worth less than the creditor is owed) 
entitled to monthly interest payments in lieu of being able to immediately foreclose 
on the collateral? Despite the billions of dollars at stake for the commercial lending 
industry, the Court answered “no.”131 Writing for a unanimous court, Scalia’s 
opinion carefully weaved together no fewer than five seemingly unconnected 
provisions of the Code to reach a holistic conclusion that Congress did not intend 
for undersecured creditors to receive post-petition interest.132 
Not only did Timbers resolve a critical question in bankruptcy, it also offered 
a roadmap to judges for how to use the Code holistically to reach clear and 
supportable conclusions for the many routine questions that lack a direct answer in 
the Code.133 Importantly, Timbers is not a purely textualist decision, at least insofar 
                                                      
130 484 U.S. 365 (1988). 
131 See Dembart & Markell, supra note 12, at 374.  
132 Timbers, 484 U.S. at 382. The Timbers opinion focuses on the interrelation between 
the automatic stay in 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982 ed. and Supp. IV) (which prevents a secured 
lender from foreclosing on the property during the bankruptcy) and the adequate protection 
provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 361 (which ensure that a secured creditor’s property interests are 
protected during the pendency of the stay). Id. at 369–71. However, the opinion also pays 
careful attention to Section 506, which addressed the difference between secured claims and 
unsecured claims, id. at 371–74, and enhances the analysis with references to Sections 552, 
id. at 374, and 1129 of the Code. Id. at 377–78. 
133 See, e.g., Waldron & Berman, supra note 12, at 210 (arguing that the Code calls for 
“a holistic and nuanced process” of interpretation). However, not all commentators agree 
with the reasoning in Timbers. See, e.g., Tabb & Lawless, supra note 48, at 836 (describing 
Timbers’ holistic approach to the Code as “workmanlike, if not always compelling”). 
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as textualism is perceived to involve a narrow focus on specific statutory 
provisions.134 Instead, there is also an element of purposivism to the decision, in that 
Scalia was trying to discern Congress’ purpose by broadly examining the text of the 
Code as a whole.135  
Timbers is a particularly helpful case for analyzing various theories about the 
distinction between textualism and purposivism. For example, in his book Judging 
Statutes, Judge Robert Katzmann argued that most judges are “neither wholly 
textualists nor wholly purposivists.”136 Undoubtedly a fierce textualist like Scalia, 
who has vocally critiqued the purposivist movement,137 would likely consider 
himself one of the exceptions; however, his decision in Timbers helps prove 
Katzmann’s point. Katzmann has argued that even a textualist’s toolbox can help to 
unlock “the institutional context that may serve as a guide to understanding a 
statute’s meaning.”138 Viewed from this perspective, Timbers perhaps represents an 
apex in judicial decisionmaking, where textualism and purposivism meet to achieve 
a clear and justifiable result for bankruptcy law.139  
Judge Marjorie Rendell of the Third Circuit has made a similar point about 
Justice Scalia’s later decision in Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Union 
Planters Bank., N.A.140 That case resolved an important question about the extent to 
which nontrustees can recover administrative expenses for costs incurred in 
preserving assets for the benefit of all creditors.141 Administrative expenses are the 
gold standard142 for bankruptcy claimants, because they are paid before most other 
claims,143 so courts frequently deal with litigants who are trying to fit a square peg 
of nonadministrative expenses into the round hole of 11 U.S.C. 503(b).144 The stakes 
                                                      
134 Some have aptly termed this “petty textualism.” See, e.g., NOURSE, supra note 27, 
at 107. 
135 Katzmann has defined purposivism as the process by which judges “glean[] the 
purpose and policy underlying the legislation” in order to “deduce[] the outcome most 
consistent with those purposes.” KATZMANN, supra note 29, at 31–32. 
136 Id. at 55.  
137 SCALIA, supra note 18, at 22. 
138 KATZMANN, supra note 29, at 55. 
139 Waldron & Berman, supra note 12, at 204–05. Timbers is also a significant decision 
for other reasons, namely Justice Scalia’s uncharacteristic use of legislative history. See infra 
Section VI.C. 
140 530 U.S. 1 (2000). 
141 Id. at 3.  
142 See generally Elizabeth Lea Black, What Are “Administrative Expenses” Under 
§ 503(b) of Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C.A. § 503(b)) Granted First Priority for Payment 
Pursuant to § 507 (a)(1) of Code (11 U.S.C.A. § 507(a)(1)), 140 A.L.R. Fed. 1, 1 (1997) 
(explaining that because administrative expenses receive top priority in bankruptcy, “[i]t is 
not surprising therefore that so many cases have arisen in which the courts have been required 
to determine what constitutes” such an expense). 
143 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2) (2012) (placing non-trustee administrative expenses in 
third priority position for payment, after trustee expenses (§ 507(a)(1)(C)) and certain 
domestic support obligations (§ 507(a)(1)(A) and (B))).  
144 See generally Judy Simmons Henry, Recovery of Creditors’ Costs from the 
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are even higher under the particular Code provision at issue in Hartford 
Underwriters—11 U.S.C. 506(c), which allows some administrative expenses to be 
paid by taxing the collateral of secured creditors.  
Thus, commercial lenders nationwide were paying close attention to Hartford 
Underwriters, as an insurance company that had floated workers compensation 
premiums for a Chapter 11 debtor (“Hen House”) tried to recover those premiums 
from the bankruptcy estate. To get paid, the insurer had to overcome a common road 
block in Chapter 11 cases: all of Hen House’s assets were encumbered by liens, 
meaning that there were no assets available for any unsecured creditors, including 
administrative claim holders.145 Nonetheless, the insurer had on its side a wealth of 
case law indicating that creditors who have preserved assets in a way that benefits 
secured lenders are entitled to recover from those assets. But to seal its recovery, the 
insurer had to convince the Supreme Court that the words “[t]he trustee may recover 
from property securing an allowed secured claim”146 in 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) did not 
exclude nontrustees from pursuing the same recovery.147  
In another unanimous decision authored by Justice Scalia, the Court concluded 
that the insurer could not recover.148 Applying a variety of canons of construction, 
the court reasoned that the natural reading of 506(c) excluded nontrustees, and then 
explained why the insurer could not meet the “exceptionally heavy”149 burden of 
convincing the court to look beyond this plain text.150 As Judge Rendell pointed out, 
Justice Scalia’s decision went well beyond the narrow words of the statutory 
provision at issue, exemplifying a “holistic approach” to statutory interpretation.151 
She further argued that this decision and others like it provide much needed guidance 
to lower courts to engage in a “broad, contextual approach” to interpreting the 
Bankruptcy Code.152  
 
B.  A Commitment to Texualism Regardless of Outcome 
 
The second hallmark of Justice Scalia’s rule-based textualism in bankruptcy 
law is his commitment to interpreting the text reasonably regardless of the outcome. 
The moral philosopher Immanuel Kant was perhaps best known for the phrase, “let 
justice reign, should all the rascals of the universe perish.”153 Justice Scalia’s 
                                                      
Bankruptcy Estate: Reasonable, Necessary, and . . . Uncertain?, 18 U.A.L.R. L.J. 199, 209–
11 (1996) (discussing the available avenues of recovery for creditors). 
145 Hartford Underwriters, 530 U.S. at 4.  
146 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (2012). 
147 Hartford Underwriters, 530 U.S. at 5–6. 
148 Id. at 14.  
149 Id. at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 
753, 760 (1992)). 
150 Id. 
151 Rendell, supra note 1, at 892–94. 
152 Id. at 888. 
153 IMMANUEL KANT, PROJECT FOR PERPETUAL PEACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY 61 
(1796) (“[F]iat justitia, pereat mundus . . . .”). 
2017] SCALIA’S BANKRUPTCY JURISPRUDENCE 963 
approach in several of the Supreme Court’s bankruptcy cases turned this Kantian 
ideal on its head, with Scalia explaining that it is a judge’s role to do what Congress 
has instructed, not what the judge believes is the just outcome. In his own words: 
“[i]f you’re going to be a good and faithful judge, you have to resign yourself to the 
fact that you’re not always going to like the conclusions you reach. If you like them 
all the time, you’re probably doing something wrong.”154  
Justice Scalia frequently found himself criticizing the majority for straining the 
text of the Bankruptcy Code to get to a preferred result from a policy perspective 
rather than the correct result from a textual perspective. The most prominent 
example is Justice Scalia’s dissent in Dewsnup v. Timm,155 a decision which is 
roundly derided as one of the worst bankruptcy decisions in recent history.156 
In Dewsnup, the Supreme Court faced a statutory question whose answer would 
have far ranging consequences for the consumer mortgage market: does 11 U.S.C. 
§ 506(d) authorize a court to reduce a lien on real property to the value of the 
collateral?157 Traditionally, a mortgage or other consensual lien on real property was 
afforded special status in bankruptcy law, with the lien typically passing through 
consumer bankruptcy untouched.158 Assuming that a debtor intended to keep a 
particular property, the lien on the property would continue unaltered through the 
bankruptcy and any eventual discharge would not affect the debtor’s basic obligation 
to continue making payments on the underlying note.159  
In 1978, however, Congress made changes to the way bankruptcy had 
traditionally treated secured interests.160 Among other things, the 1978 Code created 
a new framework for dealing with “undersecured”161 creditors, i.e. secured creditors 
                                                      
154 Gorsuch, supra note 19, at 906 (citing Justice Antonin Scalia, Madison Lecture at 
the Chapman University School of Law (Aug. 29, 2005)) (alterations in original). 
155 502 U.S. 410 (1992). 
156 See, e.g., Benjamin A. Ellison, Is It Possible That Dewsnup v. Timm Might Finally 
Be Overturned?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Jun. 2013, at 60, 60 (summarizing the criticism from 
academics and lower courts). Although the Supreme Court had an opportunity to overturn 
Dewsnup in 2015, the Court unanimously declined to do so. See Bank of America v. Caulkett, 
135 S. Ct. 1995, 2000–01 (2015). However, in a footnote joined by only six Justices, the 
Court noted the many critiques of Dewsnup and suggested that it had survived only because 
the debtors had “repeatedly insisted” that the Court did not need to overrule it. Id. at 1999–
2000 n.†. 
157 Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 411–12. 
158 Id. at 418. 
159 Id. (citing Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291, 297 (1991) (“Ordinarily, liens and 
other security interests survive bankruptcy.”)). 
160 See, e.g., In re Tanner, 14 B.R. 933, 939 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1981) (explaining that 
with the newly enacted § 506(d), “Congress announced . . . to the financing industry that 
henceforth a lien would not be protected to the extent it exceeds the value of the collateral.”). 
161 An example is a bank that loans an individual $100,000 to buy a house and takes a 
mortgage on the home to secure the debt. If the home is not worth $100,000, then the bank 
is considered “undersecured.” Bankruptcy decisions routinely use the term “undersecured” 
to refer to creditors with liens on property that is worth less than they are owed. See, e.g., 
United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., 484 U.S. 365, 372 (1988) 
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whose debt exceeded the value of the asset securing the debt.162 These creditors were 
required to file a claim with the bankruptcy court, and unless there was a timely 
objection, such a claim would be considered an “allowed claim”163 under Section 
502.164 Then, the newly promulgated Section 506(a) instructed courts to bifurcate 
the allowed claims of secured creditors into two categories: secured claims and 
unsecured claims.165 Pursuant to Section 506(a), such a creditor would be considered 
to hold a “secured claim”166 up to the value of the underlying collateral, and an 
unsecured claim for the remainder.167 Finally, Congress created Section 506(d), 
which states, “[t]o the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not 
an allowed secured claim, such lien is void.”168  
In Dewsnup, debtors sought to use Section 506(d) to partly invalidate a lien 
interest on land.169 Respondents had loaned petitioners $119,000 in exchange for a 
note and a deed of trust on two parcels of farmland.170 Petitioners filed for Chapter 
11 bankruptcy at a time when they owed the respondents $120,000 secured by land 
that was worth only $39,000.171 Once in bankruptcy court, petitioners sought to use 
Section 506 to partially invalidate the lien, capping it at the current value of the 
land.172 They argued that under Section 506(a), the court was required to bifurcate 
the respondents’ claim, creating an allowed secured claim of $39,000, with the 
balance becoming an unsecured claim.173 Then, under Section 506(d), petitioners 
argued that the court was required to avoid the lien to the extent it was not an allowed 
secured claim.174 In other words, following the sequential application of the 
                                                      
(contrasting the Code’s treatment of “undersecured” creditors with its treatment of “over 
secured creditors”); Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 428 (noting the superfluity argument “if § 506(d) 
automatically stripped liens securing undersecured claims to the value of the collateral, i.e., 
to the value of the allowed secured claims.”). 
162 See United States v. Ron Pair Enter., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989) (explaining that with 
the 1978 Code, “[c]ongress intended ‘significant changes from current law in . . . the 
treatment of secured creditors and secured claims.’”) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-595 at 180 
(1977)) (alteration in original). 
163 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2012). 
164 Id. 
165 Id. § 506(a)(1). 
166 Id.; see also Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 420–21 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining how 
Section 506(a) operates). 
167 To continue the explanation from notes 166 and 167, assume that the homeowner 
files for bankruptcy at a time when the bank is owed $100,000 but the home is only valued 
at $80,000. Applying the straightforward language of 506(a), this means that the bank has a 
secured claim for $80,000 and an unsecured claim for $20,000. 
168 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (2012). This provision goes on to describe two exceptions, 
neither of which are relevant here. 
169 Dewnsup, 502 U.S. at 412–13. 
170 Id. at 412. 
171 Id. at 413. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 414–15.  
174 Id. at 413. 
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subprovisions of Section 506, the respondents would only have a $39,000 lien on 
the property after the petitioners received their discharge.  
Justice Scalia agreed that petitioners’ reading of the statute was the most natural 
and obvious interpretation of Section 506(d).175 But the majority disagreed, and 
sided with an alternative argument developed by the respondents. Under this 
argument, the phrase “allowed secured claim” in 506(d) did not have the meaning 
defined just above in 506(a), but rather looked back to 502: if a secured creditor filed 
a claim that was “allowed” under Section 502, then the entire claim was an “allowed 
secured claim” within the meaning of 506(d).176 In other words, Section 506(d) did 
not permit any invalidation of liens where creditors were undersecured, so long as 
their claims had been “allowed.”177  
The majority admitted that this strained interpretation was “not without its 
difficulty.”178 However, the Court reasoned that pre-Code practice always allowed 
liens on real property to pass through bankruptcy, and the legislative history did not 
indicate that Congress intended such major change to pre-Code practice.179 
Moreover, the consequences of petitioners’ straightforward reading was just too 
unpalatable: 
 
The practical effect of petitioner’s argument is to freeze the creditor’s 
secured interest at the judicially determined valuation. By this approach, 
the creditor would lose the benefit of any increase in the value of the 
property by the time of the foreclosure sale. The increase would accrue to 
the benefit of the debtor, a result some of the parties describe as a 
“windfall.”180 
 
Given the possibility that the real property would appreciate in value following 
the bankruptcy, there was a risk that a debtor could use bankruptcy to unfairly benefit 
at the expense of creditors. The majority did not believe that the foundational policy 
that bankruptcy gives a debtor a “fresh start” could reasonably encompass this sort 
of windfall.181 
                                                      
175 Id. at 420–21 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
176 Id. at 417 (refusing to strip down the lien as requested by petitioners because 
“respondents’ claim is secured by a lien and has been fully allowed pursuant to § 502.”). 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. at 416. 
180 Id. at 417.  
181 Id. at 416. The respondents argued that the lien is a property right, suggesting that 
there is a Fifth Amendment takings issue implicated by the alternative reading. Id. However, 
the majority framed the respondents’ interest as a contractual one, arguing that the 
respondents should receive the benefit of their bargain:  
 
We think, however, that the creditor’s lien stays with the real property until the 
foreclosure. That is what was bargained for by the mortgagor and the mortgagee. 
The voidness language sensibly applies only to the security aspect of the lien and 
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Justice Scalia’s dissent was a masterwork of careful statutory construction. He 
opened with a scathing critique: in ignoring the straightforward interpretation of 
506(d), “the Court replaces what Congress said with what it thinks Congress ought 
to have said—and in the process disregards, and hence impairs for future use, well-
established principles of statutory construction.”182 After explaining why 
petitioners’ reading of these statutory provisions was clear,183 he elaborated in great 
detail why the respondents’ reading was strained and how it was inconsistent with 
almost every established canon of construction.184 He then picked apart the 
majority’s effort to justify its preferred reading under established canons.185  
Justice Scalia’s dissent concluded by condemning the majority’s deference to 
pre-Code practice and the absence of any contrary legislative history as 
“plainly . . . at odds with our jurisprudence.”186 Most powerful, though, were his 
closing predictions about what the majority’s decision portended for the field of 
bankruptcy law: 
 
The greater and more enduring damage of today’s opinion consists in its 
destruction of predictability, in the Bankruptcy Code and elsewhere. By 
disregarding well-established and oft-repeated principles of statutory 
construction, it renders those principles less secure and the certainty they 
are designed to achieve less attainable. When a seemingly clear provision 
can be pronounced “ambiguous” sans textual and structural analysis, and 
when the assumption of uniform meaning is replaced by “one-subsection-
at-a-time” interpretation, innumerable statutory texts become worth 
litigating. In the bankruptcy field alone, for example, unfortunate future 
litigants will have to pay the price for our expressed neutrality “as to 
whether the words ‘allowed secured claim’ have different meaning in 
other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.” . . . Having taken this case to 
resolve uncertainty regarding one provision, we end by spawning 
confusion regarding scores of others.187 
 
                                                      
then only to the real deficiency in the security. Any increase over the judicially 
determined valuation during bankruptcy rightly accrues to the benefit of the 
creditor, not to the benefit of the debtor and not to the benefit of other unsecured 
creditors whose claims have been allowed and who had nothing to do with the 
mortgagor-mortgagee bargain. 
 
Id. at 417. While bankruptcy cannot interfere with property rights, it routinely alters 
contractual expectations. Blake Rohrbacher, More Equal Than Others: Defending Property-
Contract Parity in Bankruptcy, 114 YALE L.J. 1099, 1110 (2005). 
182 Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 420.  
183 Id. at 421–23. 
184 Id. at 423–27. 
185 Id. at 427–30. 
186 Id. at 433–35. 
187 Id. at 435–36.  
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This dissent in Dewsnup was a prime example of Justice Scalia’s willingness 
to look past the practical implications of a decision and instead merely give effect to 
the statutory words that Congress had chosen. Justice Scalia agreed that the 
majority’s decision to read Section 506 in a way that avoided the prospect of debtor 
windfall was likely “fairer from the standpoint of natural justice.”188 Nonetheless, 
implementing the fairer result was “irrelevant”189 to Scalia, who only cared about 
the result commanded by the text.190 While the majority expressed concern for the 
consumer lending community, Justice Scalia was content to let the chips fall where 
they may, placing the blame for any fallout squarely on Congress.191 As he later 
observed, “Congress can enact foolish statutes as well as wise ones, and it is not for 
the courts to decide which is which and rewrite the former.”192 
Justice Scalia’s willingness to put Congress’s possibly “foolish”193 statutes194 
into effect often benefited ordinary consumers, at least hypothetically. Had Scalia’s 
view prevailed in Dewsnup, homeowners across the country would be able to use 
bankruptcy to take advantage of temporary dips in real estate prices, reaping an 
eventual windfall when prices inevitably rebounded.195 Like his decision in Timbers, 
which resulted in billions of dollars in lost interest for financial institutions,196 
Scalia’s position in Dewsnup is at odds with the conventional leftist critique that the 
Justice was a consequentialist who tended toward probusiness positions.197 Instead, 
it demonstrates that Scalia was more than willing to elevate the interests of ordinary 
                                                      
188 Id. at 435. See also SCHAUER, supra note 74, at 137 (arguing that rules themselves 
are not “just” in any real sense of the word). 
189 Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 435 (“I say irrelevant[], because a bankruptcy law has little 
to do with natural justice.”). 
190 Id.; This particular exercise of rule-based textualism dovetails well with Frederick 
Schauer’s notion that a rule’s effectiveness has nothing to do with whether it is inherently 
just. SCHAUER, supra note 74, at 137. 
191 Dewsnup, 520 U.S. at 433–34 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The fact . . . that Congress 
may not have foreseen all of the consequences of a statutory enactment is not sufficient 
reason for refusing to give effect to its plain meaning.” (internal quotations marks omitted) 
(quoting Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 157–58 (1991))). The Union Bank v. Wolas 
decision had been issued just a year earlier, and Justice Scalia had concurred in that case to 
criticize the majority’s reliance on legislative history. See infra Section V. 
192 SCALIA, supra note 18, at 20. 
193 Id. 
194 This is not to say that implementing Congress’s statutory language would have been 
foolish. In fact, Dewsnup has been roundly criticized for introducing unnecessary confusion 
and uncertainty into bankruptcy law. See, e.g., Mary Josephine Newborn, Undersecured 
Creditors in Bankruptcy: Dewsnup, Nobelman, and the Decline of Priority, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
547, 581–85 (1993) (explaining that the ambiguous majority opinion in Dewsnup 
“contribute[s] to the lack of a consistent and coherent conceptual approach to the claims of 
unsecured creditors.”). 
195 See Brief of Respondent at 34, Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992) (No. 90-
741). 
196 Dembart & Markell, supra note 12, at 374. 
197 See Eskridge, supra note 26, at 549. 
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consumers above those of large lenders—if that was the result that the statute 
enacted by Congress dictated.198 
Another example from the bankruptcy realm where Justice Scalia was willing 
to extend a statutory benefit to ordinary consumers comes from his dissent in 
Ransom v. FIA Card Services N.A.199 In Ransom, the court was faced with how to 
interpret 2005 changes to Chapter 13 bankruptcy. In Chapter 13, a debtor creates a 
long-term payment plan (usually five years200) in which a portion of the debtor’s 
income is dedicated to paying off creditors. After successfully completing the 
payment plan, the debtor receives a discharge of at least some remaining debt.201  
A critical issue in any Chapter 13 case is the amount of income that a debtor 
must dedicate to the payment plan. This amount is known as the debtor’s “projected 
disposable income,”202 and Congress created an elaborate formula for how to 
calculate it.203 Among other things, the formula draws on the amount that a debtor 
is actually paying to certain secured creditors, as well as IRS tables that calculate 
reasonable living expenses based on household size and state of residence.204  
Ransom involved a direct conflict between these actual out of pocket expenses 
and the hypothetical living expense allocations set by the IRS. The debtor in Ransom 
owned a car outright, yet still wanted to deduct the monthly payments that one-car 
households were entitled to under the IRS tables.205 The precise statutory provision 
at issue was 11 U.S.C. 707(b), which states in part: 
  
                                                      
198 A broader argument against this critique comes from the possibility that 
inconsistency in the interpretation of bankruptcy law favors large corporations that can 
engage in forum shopping, as well as high-priced lawyers and the clients that can afford 
them. Austin, supra note 63, at 1139. Scalia was arguably favoring ordinary consumer 
debtors simply by staunchly advocating for clear and consistent approaches to interpreting 
the Code. 
199 562 U.S. 61 (2011). 
200 The payment period can be three years for below-median-income debtors. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1325(b)(4) (2016). 
201 As with Chapter 7 debt, which is subject to the discharge limitations in 
11 U.S.C. § 523 (2016), Chapter 13 debt is subject to the discharge limitations in 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1328(a). 
202 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (2016). 
203 See id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)–(iv) (describing method of calculating disposable income 
under all chapters) and id. § 1325(b)(2), (3) (modifying the calculations for the purposes of 
section 1325).  
204 Essentially, Chapter 13 seeks to put a debtor on an austerity budget. The debtor is 
able to keep a reasonable portion of his or her income for daily living expenses while 
dedicating the balance to paying off creditors over the payment period. Rather than leaving 
open the question of whether a debtor’s level of continued spending is reasonable, Congress 
had the bright idea of simply directing courts to the numbers that the Internal Revenue 
Service already uses when evaluating payment plans for people who owe back taxes.  
205 Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 562 U.S. 61, 64 (2011). 
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The debtor’s monthly expenses shall be the debtor’s applicable monthly 
expense amounts specified under the National Standards and Local 
Standards, and the debtor’s actual monthly expenses for the categories 
specified as Other Necessary Expenses issued by the Internal Revenue 
Service for the area in which the debtor resides, as in effect on the date of 
the order for relief, for the debtor, the dependents of the debtor, and the 
spouse of the debtor in a joint case, if the spouse is not otherwise a 
dependent.206 
 
Petitioner argued that this subsection of 707 divides a debtor’s expenses into 
two categories.207 For expenses that the IRS has included as “Other Necessary 
Expenses,”208 courts are directed to use actual expenses when calculating disposable 
income.209 In contrast, for expenses that the IRS has included within the National 
Standards and Local Standards, courts should look to the standards when calculating 
disposable income, not what the debtor is actually spending.210 Applying this 
statutory formula, petitioner argued that, as a one-car household, he was entitled to 
deduct the applicable IRS-prescribed car ownership cost of $471 per month from the 
disposable income that he would have to allocate to creditors, even though he was 
not making any car payment.211 Although petitioner lost this argument in the Ninth 
Circuit, three circuits agreed with petitioner’s position.212 
But an eight-justice majority rejected this pro-debtor view.213 Writing for the 
majority, Justice Kagan first explained that the word “applicable” in the phrase 
“applicable monthly expense amounts specified under the National Standards and 
Local Standards”214 required a threshold inquiry about whether a debtor was eligible 
for any deduction at all.215 Because Ransom owned his car outright, he was not 
eligible for a car ownership deduction that was based on the notion that Ransom was 
actually making car payments.216  
The majority did not look favorably on the debtor’s policy arguments for why 
Congress might have intended to allow all car owners to take advantage of this 
particular deduction. First, the majority explained that allowing the debtor to shield 
                                                      
206 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(a)(ii)(I) (2016).  
207 Ransom, 562 U.S. at 74–75. 
208 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(a)(ii)(I) (2016). 
209 Ransom, 562 U.S. at 75. 
210 Id. at 74–75 
211 Id. at 67.  
212 In re Washburn, 579 F.3d 934, 935 (8th Cir. 2009), abrogated by Ransom v. FIA 
Card Services, 562 U.S. 61 (2011); In re Tate, 571 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 2009), abrogated 
by Ransom v. FIA Card Services, 562 U.S. 61 (2011); In re Ross-Tousey, 549 F.3d 1148, 
1150 (7th Cir. 2008), abrogated by Ransom v. FIA Card Services, 562 U.S. 61 (2011). 
213 Ransom, 562 U.S. at 69. 
214 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(a)(ii)(I) (2016). 
215 Ransom, 562 U.S. at 69–70. 
216 The debtor was eligible for a second category of car operating costs of $338 per 
month. Id. at 72. 
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$28,000 of “wholly fictional”217 expenses over the life of the plan was contrary to 
the purpose of Chapter 13, which was to “ensur[e] that debtors repay creditors to the 
extent they can.”218 Second, the majority reasoned that allowing the deduction in this 
case would open the door to even worse game playing, with some future debtor 
conspiring to buy a pile of “scrap metal”219 in order to claim the car ownership 
deduction for a piece of junk “sit[ting] on cinder blocks in his backyard.”220 Third, 
the majority rejected the debtor’s argument that the decision would penalize thrifty 
individuals who avoided troublesome auto loans; instead, the majority explained that 
“[m]oney is fungible: The $14,000 that [the debtor] spent to purchase his Camry 
outright was money he did not devote to paying down his credit card debt.”221 
Finally, the majority rejected the argument that Congress intended to create an 
“emergency cushion”222 that would ensure that all debtors had adequate money for 
car payments for the life of the plan, instead pointing Ransom to provisions of the 
Code that allow for plan modification in the event of changed circumstances.223  
Alone in dissent, Justice Scalia criticized the majority for straining the meaning 
of the word “applicable” far beyond what the context would reasonably support. In 
a decision that Professor Mark Tushnet believes might have just as easily have come 
from Justice Breyer,224 Justice Scalia argued that the fairest reading of the word 
“applicable” simply directed the court to the appropriate line on the specified 
table.225 In contrast, the majority’s reading of that phrase presumed an overly 
complicated directive, where the lone word “applicable” actually meant if “a 
taxpayer has no car payment, the Ownership Cost provisions of the Local Standards 
will not apply.”226 Scalia argued that if Congress had intended such a directive, there 
were much clearer ways to phrase it, and that Congress had in fact made such explicit 
distinctions in other sections of the Code.227  
To the contrary, Scalia believed that allowing all one-car households the full 
deduction that the IRS table allotted to one-car households made sense in light of a 
statutory formula that was intended to create easy and clear rules for calculating 
                                                      
217 Id. at 74. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 79 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Brown, 376 B.R. 601, 
607 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007)). 
220 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Brown, 376 B.R. at 607). As 
Scalia’s dissent points out, this “imagined horrible” is not especially powerful in light of the 
fact that a debtor who buys a heap of junk on credit gets the full $471 deduction even if he 
is paying only a fraction of that each month. Id. at 84 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
221 Id. at 79 (majority opinion). 
222 Id. at 79–80. 
223 Id. at 80. 
224 Tushnet, supra note 5, at 1189–90 (“[I]f someone handed over the [Ransom 
dissent’s] text without the line identifying its author and asked, ‘Who wrote this?,’ one could 
almost as easily answer Justice Breyer as Justice Scalia.”). 
225 Ransom, 562 U.S. at 81–82 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
226 Id. at 81 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
227 Id. at 82–83. 
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disposable income. Sometimes the formula would create advantages or 
disadvantages for individual debtors, but such is the nature of a bright-line test: 
 
The reality is, to describe it in the Court’s own terms, that occasional 
overallowance (or, for that matter, underallowance) “is the inevitable 
result of a standardized formula like the means test . . . . Congress chose 
to tolerate the occasional peculiarity that a brighter-line test produces.” 
Our job, it seems to me, is not to eliminate or reduce those “oddit[ies],” 
but to give the formula Congress adopted its fairest meaning.228 
 
Once again, Scalia was willing to tolerate a possible windfall for an ordinary 
consumer in order to serve the greater good of clear and straightforward applications 
of the bankruptcy code.229 
These initial examples of Scalia’s commitment to textualism regardless of 
outcome have been dissents. It’s easy to do textual justice when there is no real risk 
of the world perishing, so it’s fair to ask whether Scalia was only this dogmatic in 
dissent. But Scalia’s majority decision in Federal Communications Commission v. 
NextWave Personal Communications, Inc.,230 may be the exception that proves the 
rule, as Justice Breyer’s dissent implies that Scalia’s straightforward reading of the 
statute may in fact cause the world to perish—or at least the government’s world.231  
The NextWave case pitted the federal government against a struggling company 
in the high stakes world of federal telecommunications license auctions. NextWave 
was the winning bidder in an FCC auction of broadband spectrum licenses. Shortly 
                                                      
228 Id. at 84–85 (citations omitted) (alterations in original).  
229 This is not to say that Scalia always voted in favor of consumer debtors. For 
example, he was also the lone dissenter in Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505, 525 (2010) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting), which asked whether courts could take a forward looking approach 
when calculating the amount of a Chapter 13 debtor’s “projected disposable income” that 
must be allocated to plan payments. Id. at 508 (majority opinion). In that case, the Debtor 
had experienced a one-time windfall that artificially inflated her income during the six 
months leading up to bankruptcy. Id. at 511. The Debtor sought to exclude these payments 
from the calculation of disposable income even though 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A)(A)(i) 
suggested a rigid backward-looking formula. Id. at 510. In a decision authored by Justice 
Alito, the majority held that it was not necessary to follow a mechanical calculation of 
projected disposable income when there are known changes in the debtor’s income or 
expenses. Id. at 524. But Scalia again dissented, arguing that the result was contrary to the 
text, and that there were good reasons Congress would have wanted courts to calculate 
disposable income mechanically. Id. at 532–35 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Importantly, Scalia’s 
position was a neutral one: while it could harm debtors in petitioner’s position by forcing 
them to delay bankruptcy if they experienced positive one-time fluctuations in income, it 
could help debtors in the opposite position who experienced one-time decreases in income 
shortly before bankruptcy. Id. Given that most people file for bankruptcy when they are in 
weak financial condition, Scalia’s position ultimately might have benefited more ordinary 
consumers than it would have hurt. Id.  
230 537 U.S. 293 (2003).  
231 Id. at 310 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
972 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 5 
after making a down payment on its $5 billion bid and signing a promissory note 
with payment terms for the balance, NextWave filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.232  
Initially, NextWave attempted to use Chapter 11 to reduce the value of the 
licenses and by extension, the amount NextWave had to pay the government under 
its promissory note. When the Court of Appeals rejected that effort, NextWave 
proposed to pay the FCC the entire amount owed in a single lump sum payment.233 
The FCC informed NextWave that the licenses had been cancelled because 
NextWave had failed to make payments when they were due under the terms of the 
promissory note.234  
NextWave then challenged the license cancellation as a violation of 11 U.S.C. 
§ 525, an antidiscrimination provision that prevents public and private actors from 
taking a variety of employment and government actions based on the fact that a 
debtor has filed for bankruptcy.235 The terms of 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) expressly 
prohibit the government from cancelling a license solely because a licensee has filed 
for bankruptcy.236 
In what has been described by a prominent bankruptcy judge as “one of the 
most unheralded decisions of the last 25 years,” the Supreme Court agreed with 
NextWave.237 Writing for a seven-justice majority, Justice Scalia concluded that the 
FCC had violated the straightforward terms of the antidiscrimination statute when it 
canceled the licenses.238 He rejected as irrelevant the FCC’s argument that it had a 
“valid regulatory motive” for its actions, explaining: 
 
When the statute refers to failure to pay a debt as the sole cause of 
cancellation (“solely because”), it cannot reasonably be understood to 
include, among the other causes whose presence can preclude application 
of the prohibition, the governmental unit’s motive in effecting the 
cancellation. Such a reading would deprive § 525 of all force. It is hard to 
                                                      
232 Id. at 297–98 (majority opinion). 
233 Id. at 298. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. at 299. NextWave first obtained emergency relief from the bankruptcy court, but 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the decision as beyond the scope of a 
bankruptcy court’s powers. Id. at 298–99. Nextwave then filed an Administrative Procedure 
Act challenge in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, and that court agreed that the cancellation 
violated 11 U.S.C. § 525, and therefore violated the APA. Id. at 299.  
236 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (with limited and specified exceptions, “a governmental unit 
may not deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to renew a license, permit, charter, franchise, or 
other similar grant to . . . a person that is or has been a debtor under this title or a bankrupt 
or a debtor under the Bankruptcy Act, or another person with whom such bankrupt or debtor 
has been associated, solely because such bankrupt or debtor is or has been a debtor under 
this title or a bankrupt or debtor under the Bankruptcy Act, has been insolvent before the 
commencement of the case under this title, or during the case but before the debtor is granted 
or denied a discharge, or has not paid a debt that is dischargeable in the case under this title 
or that was discharged under the Bankruptcy Act.”). 
237 Dembart & Markell, supra note 12, at 380. 
238 NextWave, 537 U.S. at 301–02.  
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imagine a situation in which a governmental unit would not have some 
further motive behind the cancellation—assuring the financial solvency of 
the licensed entity . . . or punishing lawlessness, . . . or even (quite simply) 
making itself financially whole. Section 525 means nothing more or less 
than that the failure to pay a dischargeable debt must alone be the 
proximate cause of the cancellation—the act or event that triggers the 
agency’s decision to cancel, whatever the agency’s ultimate motive in 
pulling the trigger may be.239 
 
Given the context—the integrity of the multibillion dollar auctions that the 
federal government was routinely conducting among telecommunications firms—
the FCC argued it would be catastrophic to its operations to apply Congress’ 
antidiscrimination provision to licenses bought at auction.240 Justice Breyer found 
this argument highly convincing, arguing that the majority’s decision portended 
disaster, not just for the FCC, but for any situation in which the government 
attempted to use the tools of a private lienholder: 
 
It is dangerous, however, in any actual case of interpretive difficulty to 
rely exclusively upon the literal meaning of a statute’s words divorced 
from consideration of the statute’s purpose. . . . The Court’s literal 
interpretation of the statute threatens to create a serious anomaly. It seems 
to say that a government cannot ever enforce a lien on property that it has 
sold on the installment plan as long as (1) the property is a license, (2) the 
buyer has gone bankrupt, and (3) the government wants the license back 
solely because the buyer did not pay for it. . . . Yet every private 
commercial seller, every car salesman, every residential home developer, 
every appliance company can threaten repossession of its product if a 
buyer does not pay—at least if the seller has taken a security interest in the 
product. . . . Why should the government (state or federal), and the 
government alone, find it impossible to repossess a product, namely, a 
license, when the buyer fails to make installment payments?241 
 
But Scalia was unswayed by the FCC’s protests, instead directing any blame 
toward the branch of government responsible for enacting this broad provision: 
  
                                                      
239 Id. at 301–02 (citations omitted).  
240 See Brief for the Federal Communications Commission at 49, F.C.C. v. Nextwave 
Pers. Commc’ns, 537 U.S. 293 (2003) (Nos. 01-653, 01-657). 
241 NextWave, 537 U.S. at 311–12 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
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Some may think (and the opponents of § 525 undoubtedly thought) that 
there ought to be an exception for cancellations that have a valid regulatory 
purpose. Besides the fact that such an exception would consume the rule, 
it flies in the face of the fact that, where Congress has intended to provide 
regulatory exceptions to provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, it has done 
so clearly and expressly, rather than by a device so subtle as denominating 
a motive a cause.242  
 
Although NextWave involved a well-funded telecommunications company that 
could obviously afford the best lawyers and finance multiple appeals, it should not 
be mistaken for a decision that only benefits big business. Rather, its holding impacts 
small businesses and consumers well beyond this particular high stakes industry, 
because many states have statutes that impact ordinary debtors’ efforts to obtain or 
maintain a license or some other state privilege.243 Indeed, as former bankruptcy 
judge Bruce Markell pointed out, the NextWave decision “has broad implications for 
individual debtors and their everyday lives.”244 Thus, like Scalia’s dissents in 
Dewsnup and Ransom, NextWave is a decision that operates heavily in favor of 
ordinary debtors.245  
As the examples in this Section illustrate, Justice Scalia often made a valiant 
effort to divine and advocate for a text-based answer to important questions under 
the Code. The fact that the text often elevated ordinary consumers against some very 
powerful Goliaths is evidence that Justice Scalia was earnest in his cause and not 
simply using a judicial philosophy selectively to justify an outcome-driven result.  
 
C.  Ignore Legislative History 
 
A third aspect of Justice Scalia’s rule-based textualism that is highlighted in 
the bankruptcy arena is his extreme distaste for using legislative history to determine 
statutory meaning. Justice Scalia has long railed against the use of legislative history, 
concluding that at best it is an unreliable indication of Congressional intent, and at 
worst it is antidemocratic mischief.246  
Indeed, Justice Scalia believed that the only time it was appropriate for a court 
to use legislative history was when there was a credible claim of scrivener’s error: 
                                                      
242 Id. at 302 (majority opinion). 
243 Dembart & Markell, supra note 12, at 380. 
244 Id. 
245 A recent book discussing Justice Scalia’s “liberal” decisions refers in passing to two 
of Scalia’s bankruptcy decisions. See DORSEN, supra note 14, at 226 (pointing to two 
bankruptcy dissents—Hamilton and Ransom—in a discussion of decisions in which Justice 
Scalia sided with consumers). But as explained in supra note 229, Justice Scalia’s dissent in 
Hamilton was actually pro-creditor in that case, as he argued that the debtor should either 
pay significantly more toward her plan or else delay filing. However, for the reasons also 
explained in supra note 229, his advocacy of a mechanical approach to projected disposable 
income would likely lead to pro-debtor outcomes in other cases.  
246 SCALIA, supra note 18, at 17. 
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an actual drafting mistake that changed or omitted words that Congress intended to 
use, thereby altering the effect of the statute.247 One clear example would be if some 
hapless Congressional aide, tasked with transmitting the final draft of a statute to the 
printer, accidentally deleted the word “not” from a provision, thereby causing the 
opposite result of what Congress intended to be enacted into law.248 
Justice Scalia’s fight against the use of legislative history can be observed 
frequently throughout his judicial oeuvre,249 but it is perhaps most pronounced in the 
bankruptcy arena. As explained in Section III.B, bankruptcy cases tend to call for a 
more laser-like focus on statutory interpretation than other cases, so it makes sense 
that Scalia’s opposition to legislative history would also be more pronounced in this 
arena.  
But in addition to the fact that there are more opportunities to use (or misuse) 
legislative history in bankruptcy, there is also greater reason for courts to avoid 
considering it. First, legislative history introduces many inefficiencies into litigation. 
Investigating and developing arguments around legislative history is expensive for 
litigants.250 The legislative history for bankruptcy laws is extraordinarily lengthy and 
complex, with the history behind the 1978 Act alone spanning thousands of pages 
and over a decade of study.251 Moreover, the use of legislative history also introduces 
significant uncertainty into how a judge is likely to respond to these arguments. In 
turn, this increases the costs of litigation and the incentives to appeal unfavorable 
decisions. For the reasons explained in Section IV.A, increased costs and decreased 
clarity are a particularly bad prospect for bankruptcy law, which depends on 
efficiency and predictability. 
Second, the legislative history of bankruptcy laws may be particularly 
problematic, as it tends to reflect highly specialized interests rather than those of the 
main stakeholders in bankruptcy. For example, Eric Posner argued that the interests 
of individual debtors as a class are not reflected at all in the legislative history, as 
most debtors have little incentive to organize.252 Likewise, many types of creditors 
are completely unrepresented in the legislative history, while other larger creditors 
who are represented may have perverse incentives not to make the system efficient 
                                                      
247 Id. at 20.  
248 One of the few examples of an appellate court correcting scrivener’s error comes 
from the bankruptcy context, when the Second Circuit determined that Congress failed to 
renumber internal cross-references in the Code following an amendment. In re Chateaugay 
Corp., 89 F.3d 942, 954 (2d Cir. 1996).  
249 See, e.g., KATZMANN, supra note 29, at 39–40 (highlighting Scalia’s leadership in 
the textualist fight against the use of legislative history). 
250 See SCALIA, supra note 18, at 36–37 (noting his experience with the Department of 
Justice Office of Legal Counsel, where he observed that approximately 60% of lawyers’ time 
was devoted to “finding, and poring over, the incunabula of legislative history. What a 
waste.”). 
251 See Posner, supra note 69, at 67. The legislative history behind 2005’s BAPCPA 
amendments is also described as confusing and of questionable value. Waldron & Berman, 
supra note 12, at 216–17.  
252 See Posner, supra note 69, at 54–55. 
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but rather to shift costs to other creditor groups not represented in the legislative 
process.253 The legislative history for the 2005 amendments in the BAPCPA may be 
even more problematic, as some have alleged that most of this legislation was 
drafted by the credit industry, behind the scenes.254  
For these reasons, Scalia’s longstanding battle against the use of legislative 
history takes on particular valiance in the bankruptcy context. Moreover, as with his 
commitment to textualism, Scalia’s refusal to indulge legislative history also tends 
to benefit “the little guy”—i.e., the ordinary debtor or small creditor who has little 
ability or incentive to organize in order to influence Congressional 
decisionmaking.255 Although Scalia sometimes engaged the battle against legislative 
history in dissent, he most often found himself engaging in these skirmishes in 
concurrences, where he criticized the majority for its unnecessarily reliance on 
legislative history. 
A prime, early example of Scalia’s approach appears in Begier v. IRS,256 in 
which the Supreme Court answered the question of whether a Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
trustee had power to avoid the debtor’s prepetition payments of withholding and 
excise taxes to the IRS.257 The Court agreed unanimously that the answer was no, 
on the theory that a business’ payments of withheld and collected taxes to the IRS 
never belonged to the debtor in the first place; rather, these monies were merely held 
by the debtor in trust for the IRS.258 However, eight justices signed on to a lead 
opinion that relied heavily on legislative history to support that answer.259 In 
particular, the majority opinion pointed to a House Report that contains remarks 
from the Floor Manager, Representative Don Edwards that supported the Court’s 
reading of the relevant statutes.260 
Scalia’s concurrence made no bones about his distrust of legislative history:  
 
Representative Edwards, the House floor manager for the bill that enacted 
the Bankruptcy Code, said on the floor that “[t]he courts should permit the 
use of reasonable assumptions” regarding the tracing of tax trust funds. 
124 Cong. Rec. 32417 (1978). We do not know that anyone except the 
presiding officer was present to hear Representative Edwards. Indeed, we 
do not know for sure that Representative Edwards’ words were even 
                                                      
253 Id. at 55–56. 
254 See, e.g., Jean Braucher, The Challenge to the Bench and Bar Presented by the 2005 
Bankruptcy Act: Resistance Need Not Be Futile, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 93, 100 (2007) (noting 
that the legislative history of BAPCPA is “thin” and stating that “credit industry 
representatives . . . reputedly did much of the behind-the-scenes drafting”).  
255 See Posner, supra note 69, at 54–55. 
256 496 U.S. 53 (1990). 
257 Id. at 55. Under 11 § U.S.C. 547(b), certain payments made to creditors within the 
months leading up to bankruptcy are considered preferential transfers that the trustee may 
have the power to undo (or “avoid”) for the benefit of all creditors. Id. at 58. 
258 Id. at 59. 
259 Id. at 65–67. 
260 Id. 
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uttered on the floor rather than inserted into the Congressional Record 
afterwards. If Representative Edwards did speak these words, and if there 
were others present, they must have been surprised to hear him talking 
about the tracing of 26 U.S.C. § 7501 tax trust funds, inasmuch as the bill 
under consideration did not relate to the Internal Revenue Code but the 
Bankruptcy Code, and contained no provision even mentioning trust-fund 
taxes.261 
 
He concluded with a sharp rebuke to his colleagues for looking to the 
Congressional Record to evaluate legislative intent, rather than the words of the 
statute that Congress enacted: 
 
Nonetheless, on the basis of Representative Edwards’ statement, today’s 
opinion concludes that “[t]he courts are directed” (presumably it means 
directed by the entire Congress, and not just Representative Edwards) “to 
apply ‘reasonable assumptions’ to govern the tracing of funds.” Ante, at 
67 (emphasis added). I do not agree. Congress conveys its directions in the 
Statutes at Large, not in excerpts from the Congressional Record, much 
less in excerpts from the Congressional Record that do not clarify the text 
of any pending legislative proposal.262 
 
A year later, Scalia tried a somewhat different tack, using a concurrence to 
openly lament the mischief that legislative history wreaked on the system: 
 
I join the opinion of the Court, including Parts II and III, which respond 
persuasively to legislative-history and policy arguments made by 
respondent. It is regrettable that we have a legal culture in which such 
arguments have to be addressed (and are indeed credited by a Court of 
Appeals), with respect to a statute utterly devoid of language that could 
remotely be thought to distinguish between long-term and short-term debt. 
Since there was here no contention of a “scrivener’s error” producing an 
absurd result, the plain text of the statute should have made this litigation 
unnecessary and unmaintainable.263 
 
A third method of warfare that Scalia attempted was the silent treatment: saying 
nothing but simply refusing to join the portion of an opinion that referenced 
legislative history. One such example comes in Associates Commercial Corp. v. 
Rash,264 where the Court was faced with the question of how to value a secured 
                                                      
261 Id. at 67–68 (Scalia, J., concurring) (alteration in original).  
262 Id. at 68 (alterations in original). But see Dembart & Markell, supra note 12, at 379–
80 (suggesting that the Court did not pay enough attention to Congress’s disagreement with 
past Supreme Court decisions thereby introducing unnecessary confusion into bankruptcy 
doctrine). 
263 Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 163 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
264 520 U.S. 953 (1997).  
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creditor’s “allowed secured claim” for the purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).265 In 
particular, the Court had to consider whether to place a lower foreclosure value on 
a secured creditor’s interest (i.e., the amount that the creditor could recover through 
a forced sale of the property) versus a higher replacement value (i.e., the amount the 
debtor would have to pay to obtain similar property).266 
In a nearly unanimous decision, the Court held that replacement value should 
govern.267 But the decision contained a footnote explaining why the majority was 
not giving any weight to legislative history in interpreting 11 U.S.C. § 506.268 Yet 
Scalia refused even to join that footnote.269 Although he offered no explanation by 
way of a separate writing for his break with the otherwise unanimous opinion, it 
seems likely that Scalia felt that even including an explanation for why the majority 
was discounting the House and Senate Reports gave too much credit to the notion 
that legislative history could have value, at least in some cases. 
Despite his ongoing war with legislative history, in which he employed a 
variety of approaches and argument styles to try to convince his colleagues of his 
views, Justice Scalia was still fighting the same battles during his last few years on 
the Court. For example, in Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. U.S.,270 the Court 
was asked to determine whether certain prohibitions on the conduct of “debt relief 
agencies” applied to bankruptcy lawyers.271 As an aside, the majority noted that it 
was unnecessary to refer to legislative history in light of the unambiguous statute 
but observed that it did support the Court’s conclusion.272 
                                                      
265 Id. at 955–56. 
266 Id. at 957–58.  
267 Id. at 959. 
268 Id. at 963 n.4: 
 
We give no weight to the legislative history of § 506(a), noting that it is 
unedifying, offering snippets that might support either standard of valuation. The 
Senate Report simply repeated the phrase contained in the second sentence of 
§ 506(a). See S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 68 (1978). The House Report, in the Fifth 
Circuit’s view, rejected a “replacement cost” valuation. See In re Rash, 90 F.3d 
1036, 1056 (C.A.5 1996) (quoting H. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 124 (1977)). That 
Report, however, appears to use the term “replacement cost” to mean the cost of 
buying new property to replace property in which a creditor had a security interest. 
See ibid. In any event, House Report excerpts are not enlightening, for the 
provision pivotal here—the second sentence of § 506(a)—did not appear in the 
bill addressed by the House Report. The key sentence originated in the Senate 
version of the bill, compare H. R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 506(a) (1977), 
with S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 506(a) (1977), and was included in the final 
text of the statute after the House-Senate conference, see 124 Cong. Rec. 33997 
(1978).  
 
269 Id. at 955 (“[A]nd in all but n.4 of which Scalia, J., joined.”). 
270 559 U.S. 229 (2010).  
271 Id. at 232–24. 
272 Id. at 236 n.3. 
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However, unlike the prominent discussion spanning three pages of text in 
Begier, this time the legislative history was presented only in a brief footnote.273 Yet 
Scalia’s rebuke was no less sharp than it had been twenty years earlier in Begier. 
First, he took issue with the majority’s assertion that the House Report “indicate[d] 
concern with abusive practices undertaken by attorneys”:274 
 
Perhaps, but only the concern of the author of the Report. Such statements 
tell us nothing about what the statute means, since (1) we do not know that 
the members of the Committee read the Report, (2) it is almost certain that 
they did not vote on the Report (that is not the practice), and (3) even if 
they did read and vote on it, they were not, after all, those who made this 
law.275  
 
Next, he reminded his colleagues of the critical role of the Senate and president 
in making a bill into a law, which further minimized the evidentiary value of this 
particular House Report: 
 
Even indulging the extravagant assumption that Members of the House 
other than members of its Committee on the Judiciary read the Report (and 
the further extravagant assumption that they agreed with it), the Members 
of the Senate could not possibly have read it, since it did not exist when 
the Senate passed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005. And the President surely had more important 
things to do.276  
 
Then, he turned to the other source of legislative history mentioned in the 
majority’s footnote, which he found “truly mystifying”:277 
 
For the proposition that “the legislative record elsewhere documents 
misconduct by attorneys” which was presumably the concern of Congress, 
the Court cites a reproduction of a tasteless advertisement that was (1) an 
attachment to the written statement of a witness, (2) in a hearing held seven 
years prior to this statute’s passage, (3) before a subcommittee of the 
House considering a different consumer bankruptcy reform bill that never 
passed. “Elsewhere” indeed.278  
  
                                                      
273 Id. 
274 Id.  
275 Id. at 253 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
276 Id. 
277 Id. at 254.  
278 Id.  
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He concluded by once again expressing frustration with the fact that the Court 
had even mentioned the existence of legislative history, explaining that the mere fact 
that the Supreme Court was acknowledging these arguments would encourage their 
continued use in the future: 
 
Our cases have said that legislative history is irrelevant when the statutory 
text is clear. . . . The footnote advises conscientious attorneys that this is 
not true, and that they must spend time and their clients’ treasure combing 
the annals of legislative history in all cases: To buttress their case where 
the statutory text is unambiguously in their favor; and to attack an 
unambiguous text that is against them. . . . Even for those who believe in 
the legal fiction that committee reports reflect congressional intent, 
footnote 3 is a bridge too far.279  
 
As these examples spanning a quarter century suggest, Justice Scalia was a 
strong crusader against legislative history. Indeed, even this small sampling of 
bankruptcy decisions shows that he attempted many different strategies to try to 
engage his colleagues to join the fight. Yet the 2010 decision in the Milavetz case 
suggests that his twenty-five years of advocacy may have fallen on deaf ears.280  
But Milavetz may not have been the final battleground for Scalia. In Husky Int’l 
Elec. Inc., v. Ritz,281 an appeal that was briefed before Scalia’s death, but argued and 
decided after his death, the parties relied heavily on legislative history to evaluate 
an exception to discharge. At issue was whether a corporate-director-turned-debtor’s 
expropriation of corporate assets that should have been paid to a vendor could 
constitute “actual fraud” under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), even where the debtor had 
not made any representations to the vendor.282 A Supreme Court opinion ten years 
earlier had interpreted this provision in a different context to require the creditor’s 
reasonable reliance on a false statement by the debtor.283  
In Husky, both the petitioner and the Solicitor General as amicus curiae pointed 
to legislative history stating that the exception to discharge was intended to codify 
an 1877 decision, Neal v. Clark.284 Legislative history was also a prominent theme 
at oral argument.285 In a 7-1 decision, the majority appeared to accept this line of 
argument, relying in part on the 1878 decision identified in the House and Senate 
                                                      
279 Id.  
280 But see KATZMANN, supra note 29, at 45 (providing examples of how Scalia’s 
crusade against legislative history has impacted lawmakers and the courts). 
281 136 S. Ct. 1581 (2016).  
282 Id. at 1587. 
283 Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 61 (1995). 
284 Brief for Petitioner at 5, Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581 (2016) (No. 
15-145); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 12–13, Husky 
Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581 (2016) (No. 15-145). 
285 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 
1581 (2016) (No. 15-145); id. at 12–14 (questions of Roberts, C.J., and answers of 
Petitioner); id. at 36 (argument of Respondent). 
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Reports. Yet legislative history is not mentioned once in the decision.286 It is almost 
as if the majority was paying tribute to their deceased colleague’s view that the 
words “legislative history” should never again grace the pages of the Supreme Court 
Reporter.287 
 
D.  Make the Scope of Bankruptcy Courts’ Authority Clear 
 
A fourth way in which Justice Scalia sought to bring clarity and predictability 
to bankruptcy law was his advocacy for simple and straightforward rules to govern 
the scope of a bankruptcy court’s authority. The scope of a bankruptcy judge’s 
authority is a recurring question enshrouded in a cloud of uncertainty. The legislative 
history behind the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 shows a full decade of 
jurisdictional skirmishes, with Article III judges pushing for bankruptcy judges to 
have less power; bankruptcy judges pushing for Article III status; and legislative and 
executive forces pushing for a centralized agency that would take power away from 
the courts altogether.288 By ultimately choosing a compromise that entrusted 
bankruptcy matters to non-Article III judges who would exercise increased powers, 
Congress created a hornet’s nest for the federal courts.  
The differences between Article III judges and bankruptcy judges are stark. 
Article III judges are appointed by the President, confirmed by the Senate, and have 
life tenure during which time their salary cannot be diminished. In contrast, 
bankruptcy judges are appointed by the federal appellate judges in their Circuit to 
fourteen-year terms, and their salary can be changed by Congress. Article III judges 
must be formally impeached, whereas there are less rigid mechanisms in which 
bankruptcy judges can lose their appointment or fail to be reappointed.289  
For good reasons, Article III judges are protective of their special constitutional 
status and are wary of actions by the other branches of government that might 
undermine their independence.290 Thus, questions as to whether and how bankruptcy 
judges can make factual and legal determinations has been the subject of recurring 
challenge, particularly since the Supreme Court’s 1982 decision in Northern 
Pipeline.291 
                                                      
286 Husky is perhaps an example of an ominous trend toward pretending that statutory 
language is not ambiguous, and hiding the true basis for a decision. See, e.g., Braucher, supra 
note 254, at 98–99 (noting the trend and arguing that “the law cannot be predictable when 
judges do not give their real reasons for decision.”).  
287 Interestingly, the author of the Husky decision was Justice Sotomayor, who also 
authored the Milavetz decision that drew such a powerful tirade from her colleague.  
288 Posner, supra note 69, at 74–82.  
289 See generally FED. JUDICIAL CTR., COURTS: A BRIEF OVERVIEW, 
https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/courts-brief-overview [https://perma.cc/3Z42-7TK3] 
(describing the differences between Article I and Article III judges). 
290 See, e.g., N. Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60 (1982) 
(courts must “jealously guard[ ]” their Article III powers). 
291 See supra Section III.A. Notably, the federal judiciary was highly opposed to any 
increase in the stature or power of bankruptcy judges relative to Article III judges. See 
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But questions about the proper method for courts to hear and resolve disputes 
also produce inefficiencies. For example, infirmities in subject matter jurisdiction—
meaning a federal court’s constitutional authority to hear and decide a case—can be 
raised at any stage in a proceeding.292 This means that parties can litigate in a trial 
court, and then pursue the full range of appeals, only to have a higher court decide 
that none of this time and effort should have been expended in the first place because 
the federal courts never had subject matter jurisdiction. The inefficiency risk is 
significant in any case, but it is particularly counterproductive in bankruptcy matters, 
for the reasons set forth in Section IV.A above.  
Accordingly, Scalia’s belief that rules regarding the scope of bankruptcy 
judges’ powers should be clear and predictable is a particularly welcome stance for 
the bankruptcy field. If courts and litigants have more certainty about the extent and 
nature of a bankruptcy court’s authority to make factual and legal determinations, 
they are more likely to identify potential problems in a timely manner. In turn, they 
are less likely to continue to devote resources to matters in which there is a risk that 
all the bankruptcy court’s work will be for naught if some higher level court sees a 
constitutional problem that the parties and bankruptcy judge did not consider. 
Scalia’s advocacy for clear and predictable constitutional rules is quite apparent 
in his bankruptcy decisions. Although he was not on the Court for its seminal 
decision in Northern Pipeline, one of his earliest opportunities to advocate for clear 
constitutional rules came in the 1989 case of Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,293 
which involved the question of whether the Seventh Amendment creates a right to a 
jury trial for a nonclaimant who is defending against a fraudulent transfer action 
brought by a bankruptcy trustee.294 By a 6-3 vote, the majority concluded that the 
nonclaimant did have a right to a jury trial.295 Scalia ultimately agreed with this 
conclusion.296 
Concurring, Scalia wrote, “[t]his central feature of the Constitution must be 
anchored in rules, not set adrift in some multifactored ‘balancing test.’”297 His main 
criticism of the majority was its unwillingness to embrace bright line rules in its 
formulations.298 In particular, he argued that the Court had butchered the public 
rights doctrine, a longstanding theory of when certain constitutional protections 
would apply.299 In Scalia’s view, a better approach would center on clear rules; for 
example, Scalia believed that at a minimum, the United States must be a party to the 
                                                      
Posner, supra note 69, at 74–75. As Posner describes it, last minute lobbying by Chief Justice 
Warren E. Burger resulted in “remarkably petty reductions in the independence and status of 
bankruptcy judges” by the Senate. Id. at 90–91. 
292 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) (2017). 
293 492 U.S. 33 (1989). 
294 Id. at 36. 
295 Id. at 35–36. 
296 Id. at 65 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
297 Id. at 70. 
298 Id. (“I do not think one can preserve a system of separation of powers on the basis 
of such intuitive judgments . . . .”). 
299 Id. at 65–69. 
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adjudication for the doctrine to apply.300 That way, if the United States was not a 
party to litigation, the court and the parties could be confident that public rights 
doctrine would not be implicated. 
But, as with his unsuccessful war on legislative history, Scalia’s efforts to 
promote certainty regarding bankruptcy judges’ authority were of limited impact. 
Indeed, more than two decades after Granfinanciera, Chief Justice Roberts wrote a 
thirty-six-page lead opinion in Stern v. Marshall,301 in which he attempted to explain 
the proper scope of a bankruptcy judge’s authority.302 Justice Scalia added to the 
page tally with a short concurrence criticizing the majority’s efforts as unwieldy:  
 
The sheer surfeit of factors that the Court was required to consider in this 
case should arouse the suspicion that something is seriously amiss with 
our jurisprudence in this area. . . . Apart from their sheer numerosity, the 
more fundamental flaw in the many tests suggested by our jurisprudence 
is that they have nothing to do with the text or tradition of Article 
III. . . . The multifactors relied upon today seem to have entered our 
jurisprudence almost randomly.303  
 
Justice Scalia had more success with a second aspect of his battle for clear rules 
to circumscribe the scope of a bankruptcy judge’s power: constraining the judge’s 
equitable authority under 11 U.S.C. § 105. Section 105 is a seemingly broad 
provision of the Code that authorizes a bankruptcy judge to “issue any order, 
process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of 
this title,” including orders “to prevent an abuse of process.”304 Bankruptcy courts 
had relied on this provision to support a wide array of outcomes not directly provided 
for by the Code, leading some critics to argue that bankruptcy judges were assuming 
equitable powers that were reducing clarity and predictability.305  
But it seemed that these criticisms had fallen on deaf ears in 2007 when a 
closely divided Supreme Court held that Section 105 powers could be exercised in 
a manner that conflicted with the text of the Code.306 In Marrama v. Citizens Bank 
                                                      
300 Id. at 70. 
301 564 U.S. 462 (2011). 
302 Id. at 485–99. 
303 Id. at 503–04 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
304 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2017). 
305 See, e.g., Alan M. Ahart, The Limited Scope of Implied Powers of a Bankruptcy 
Judge: A Statutory Court of Bankruptcy, Not a Court of Equity, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 32–
33 (2005) (arguing that bankruptcy courts should not employ traditional equitable doctrines); 
Daniel B. Bogart, Resisting the Expansion of Bankruptcy Court Power under Section 105 of 
the Bankruptcy Code: The All Writs Act and an Admonition from Chief Justice Marshall, 35 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 793, 824–25 (2003) (arguing that bankruptcy courts too often use equitable 
powers to diminish the role of procedure and rules). 
306 Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367–68 (2007); see Jeffrey W. 
Warren, Revisiting the Inherent Equitable Powers of the Bankruptcy Court: Does Marrama 
v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts Signal a Return to Equity?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 
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of Massachusetts,307 the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a 
bankruptcy judge could deny a debtor’s motion to convert a Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
into Chapter 13, notwithstanding language in the Code that purported to give a 
debtor an absolute right to conversion.308  
But in Marrama, the debtor was deemed to be abusing the provisions of the 
Code: first, the debtor attempted to shield assets from Chapter 7 liquidation; then, 
when the trustee chased down these assets, the debtor sought to convert his petition 
to Chapter 13, thereby allowing the debtor to retain these assets through 
bankruptcy.309 The bankruptcy court denied the debtor’s motion to convert under 11 
U.S.C. § 105, which authorizes a court to take any action necessary to prevent an 
“abuse of process,” and a five-justice majority held that this was a proper exercise 
of the bankruptcy court’s powers.310  
Justice Scalia joined the dissent in Marrama, which argued that 11 U.S.C. § 
105 did not give bankruptcy judges the power to stray from clear statutory 
commands.311 And just seven years later, the dissent’s core view on the limits of a 
bankruptcy court’s powers carried the day in Law v. Siegel,312 with Justice Scalia’s 
opinion for a unanimous court concluding that the bankruptcy court lacked power 
under 11 U.S.C. § 105 to issue orders that were inconsistent with the commands of 
the Code.313  
In perhaps the most factually bizarre modern bankruptcy case to make it to the 
Supreme Court, Law involved a debtor who had fraudulently documented a 
nonexistent lien on his house in order to try to keep it out of the hands of real 
creditors.314 As the suspicious trustee got closer to chasing down the true facts, the 
debtor redoubled his efforts, even going so far as to file a foreclosure action 
purportedly on behalf of this phantom lienholder.315 The trustee eventually 
succeeded in proving to the bankruptcy court that no such lien existed, but along the 
way the trustee incurred almost half a million dollars in fees and costs.316 Yet when 
the house was ultimately sold for the benefit of creditors, the trustee expected to 
recover only a small portion of his costs, while the debtor expected to receive 
$75,000 of the sale proceeds under his state homestead exemption.317  
In light of the debtor’s outrageous conduct, the trustee asked the bankruptcy 
court to use its equitable powers to deny the debtor his homestead exemption and 
                                                      
2007, at 22, 22 (concluding that Marrama was “cause for celebration by those concerned 
about the trend that was limiting the exercise of judicial discretion by bankruptcy courts.”).  
307 549 U.S. 365 (2007). 
308 Id. at 368. 
309 Id. at 368–69. 
310 Id. at 374–76. 
311 Id. at 382 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
312 134 S. Ct. 1188 (2014). 
313 Id. at 1198. 
314 Id. at 1193. 
315 In re Law, 401 B.R. 447, 451 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2009).  
316 Law, 134 S. Ct. at 1193. 
317 Id. 
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instead award that $75,000 to the trustee as partial reimbursement. Following Ninth 
Circuit precedent, the bankruptcy court agreed.318 On appeal to the Supreme Court, 
the Court unanimously reversed. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia explained, “[i]t 
is hornbook law that § 105(a) does not allow the bankruptcy court to override 
explicit mandates of other sections of the Bankruptcy Code.”319 Although Section 
105(a) “confers authority to ‘carry out’ the provisions of the Code, [] it is quite 
impossible to do that by taking action that the Code prohibits.”320 Because 11 U.S.C. 
§ 522 gave the debtor the right to the homestead exemption prescribed by his state, 
the bankruptcy court’s order violated an “express term” of the court, and was 
therefore reversed.321  
The impact of Law was both broad and immediate,322 as it arguably gave 
bankruptcy courts authority to “eviscerate”323 longstanding precedent regarding the 
scope of their equitable powers under Section 105.324 Such a result is consistent with 
Justice Scalia’s general commitment to reducing arbitrary decisionmaking and 
increasing predictability.325 From this perspective, the decision in Law can be read 
as a dramatic rollback of bankruptcy judge’s authority to engage in ad hoc 
decisionmaking.326  
Similarly, Justice Scalia’s decision in RadLAX327 has also been described as a 
decision that is, at its core, about “the proper domain of the bankruptcy judge.”328 
On its face, RadLAX involves the proper construction of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2), 
which applies when a Chapter 11 plan must be crammed down, i.e., confirmed over 
                                                      
318 Id. at 1193–94.  
319 Id. at 1194 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
320 Id.  
321 Id. at 1195. Justice Scalia’s discussion of the 2007 Marrama decision raises some 
questions about his fidelity to precedent. See infra Section VI.D. 
322 See Hon. Christopher D. Jaime, Objections to Exemptions Under State Law After 
Law v. Siegel, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2017, at 14, 14 (“By now, nearly every federal 
judge, trustee and bankruptcy practitioner has in one way or another heard about, read or felt 
the impact of the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion.”). 
323 See, e.g., Ashley M. McDow & Michael T. Delaney, Law v. Siegel—The End of 
Equitable Authority of the Bankruptcy Court?, 33 CAL. BANKR. J. 249, 277 (2015) 
(explaining that the “broad reasoning employed throughout [the decision] provides courts 
with ample bases to eviscerate existing precedent authorizing the Bankruptcy Court to utilize 
its equitable authority to prevent abuse.”). 
324 Id. at 276. 
325 See SCALIA, supra note 18, at 28. 
326 See Law, 134 S. Ct. at 1194–95 (“[W]hatever equitable powers remain in the 
bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy 
Code.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Such language suggests a 
trend toward the proceduralist view, which constrains judges’ authority, as opposed to the 
traditionalist view, which advocates for broad discretion. See Baird, supra note 6, at 595.  
327 RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639 (2012). 
328 See Douglas G. Baird and Anthony J. Casey, Bankruptcy Step Zero, 2012 SUP. CT. 
REV. 203, 218 (2012) (describing RadLAX as part of “a family of cases in which the Court 
has limited the domain over which the bankruptcy judge may exercise her discretion.”).  
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the objections of classes of creditors who will be impaired by the plan.329 In cases 
involving cramdown, a prerequisite to confirmation is that the plan be “fair and 
equitable,”330 and the three subprovisions of Section 1129(b)(2)(A) state the 
conditions under which a court may satisfy itself that a plan is fair and equitable as 
to a secured creditor who has objected to confirmation.  
In RadLAX, Amalgamated Bank served as trustee for a secured creditor who 
was owed $120 million secured by a mortgage on a hotel that was under 
construction.331 The debtor ran out of money and, unable to complete the project, 
filed for Chapter 11. Under the debtor’s Chapter 11 plan, the hotel would be sold at 
auction “free and clear”332 of the Bank’s mortgage, and the Bank would be repaid 
based on the proceeds of the sale.333 However, a key point of contention was that the 
Bank would not be allowed to “credit bid,”334 and would instead have to bid with 
cash if it wanted to take the property at auction.335 The Bank argued that this violated 
the specific provision in Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) that applied to “free and clear” 
sales.336 But the plan proponents argued that the court could rely on an alternate basis 
for finding that the plan is fair and equitable: Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii), which 
authorizes confirmation so long as the secured creditor realizes the “indubitable 
equivalent”337 of its lien interest.338 According to this argument, the amount bid at 
auction would by definition be the “indubitable equivalent” of the Bank’s interest in 
the property.339  
Notwithstanding the market-based appeal of this logic, the Supreme Court 
disagreed. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Court disregarded 
the disjunctive “or” in the three-part subprovision of Section 1129(a)(2)(A).340 
Instead, applying the “general/specific canon,”341 the Court held that the specific 
                                                      
329 RadLAX, 566 U.S. at 642. 
330 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2017). 
331 RadLAX, 566 U.S. at 641. 
332 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2012). 
333 RadLAX, 566 U.S. at 644. 
334 “Credit bid” means that the bank could attempt to buy back the collateral from the 
estate at auction without putting up any cash, simply by bidding the amount it was already 
owed. Baird & Casey, supra note 328, at 207. 
335 For a discussion of the problems with sales that do not allow credit bidding, see 
Michael J. Hoffman, RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank: Examining the 
Importance of Credit Bids at Chapter 11 Asset Sales, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1223, 1248–53 
(2013). 
336 RadLAX, 566 U.S. at 643–44. 
337 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2017). 
338 Id. 
339 RadLAX, 566 U.S. at 643–44. 
340 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii)–(iii) (2017).  
341 RadLAX, 566 U.S. at 645 (“It is a commonplace of statutory construction that the 
specific governs the general. . . . [P]articularly . . . where . . . Congress has enacted a 
comprehensive scheme and has deliberately targeted specific problems with specific 
solutions.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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subprovision dealing directly with “free and clear” sales controlled in all free and 
clear sales and required that secured creditors be allowed to credit bid.342  
As Professors Douglas Baird and Anthony Casey argued that a significant 
impact of the RadLAX decision is to constrain a bankruptcy judge’s ability to 
evaluate bankruptcy sales on a case by case basis.343 Accordingly, they place 
RadLAX in line with decisions like Stern and Granfinanciera, in terms of the limits 
they impose on the judicial powers of bankruptcy judges. Read from this 
perspective, Justice Scalia’s unanimous opinions in RadLAX and Law both strongly 
vindicate the views that he had previously expressed in concurrences that there 
should be clear rules that define and limit the scope of bankruptcy judges’ power.  
Litigation over the scope of a bankruptcy judge’s power to hear and resolve 
issues introduces a layer of cost and uncertainty into bankruptcy proceedings. 
Likewise, the possibility that a bankruptcy judge can use equitable powers to 
contravene the plain language of the text reduces predictability and encourages the 
parties to spend resources pressing a wider range of arguments in the hopes of 
triggering the judge’s sense of equity.344 Justice Scalia’s consistent advocacy for 
simpler and easier tests would have the laudable effect of minimizing that added 
burden for all parties, as well as for the bankruptcy courts themselves. But as with 
the other aspects of his judicial philosophy, the benefits for lower courts have not 
been fully realized.345 Instead, lower courts still find these issues cloudy and 
uncertain, perhaps for the reasons explored in the next Section. 
 
VI.  THE WEAK SPOTS IN JUSTICE SCALIA’S BANKRUPTCY OEUVRE 
 
As Sections IV and V suggest, several aspects of Justice Scalia’s rule-based 
textualism seem to be an excellent fit for bankruptcy practice. However, as Section 
V also shows, Justice Scalia was often advocating these positions in concurrence, or 
even dissent. If Scalia’s rules were such a great fit for bankruptcy law, why didn’t 
more of his colleagues sign on to them?346  
  
                                                      
342 RadLAX, 566 U.S. at 643–48. 
343 Baird & Casey, supra note 328, at 216–20.  
344 See, e.g., SCHAUER, supra note 74, at 144–47 (explaining the efficiency benefits in 
reducing the acceptable range of decisionmaking).  
345 See Dembart & Markell, supra note 12, at 394–95 (noting that the constitutional 
status of the bankruptcy courts as well as the statutes defining the limits of their authority are 
not entirely clear). 
346 See Braucher, supra note 254, at 99 (arguing that despite Justice Scalia’s staunch 
advocacy, most Justices “have lost patience with rigid textualism”); see also Dembart & 
Markell, supra note 12, at 386–87 (arguing that despite Justice Scalia’s textual revolution, 
the Supreme Court had not provided any meaningful clarity for lower court judges); Waldron 
& Berman, supra note 12, at 202–03 (lamenting the “confusion” and “contradiction” in the 
Supreme Court’s bankruptcy decisions). 
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This Section will attempt to pinpoint an answer to a question that was 
undoubtedly quite vexing for Justice Scalia himself. In particular, this Section will 
highlight four ways in which Justice Scalia muddied the rule-based textualism that 
he demonstrated so well in majority opinions like Timbers and dissents like 
Dewsnup.  
First, Part A illustrates that despite his bluster about allowing the text to be the 
ultimate arbiter of statutory meaning, he sometimes appeared to embrace the sort of 
extratextual interpretive tools that he shunned elsewhere. Second, Part B highlights 
that Scalia’s failure to articulate or apply clear rules regarding the role of pre-Code 
practice made him susceptible to the very accusations of judicial policymaking that 
he leveled against his colleagues. Third, Part C shows that Justice Scalia was not 
consistent in his dismissive attitude toward legislative history and sometimes even 
discussed it in his own decisions. Fourth, Part D suggests that Scalia made frequent 
and perhaps hypocritical use of the label “dicta” in order to reject the clearest and 
most predictable path to discerning answers that would not be overturned on appeal: 
namely, past precedent.347  
Even Scalia himself was not consistent in championing the most clear and 
predictable path for bankruptcy law. This is not especially surprising, as it seems 
unrealistic to expect any judge to demonstrate an unequivocal commitment to fixed 
principles in every single case.348 But when the strongest proponent of rule-based 
textualism appears to be straying from the rules in particular cases, the entire 
philosophy is undermined.349 
 
A.  Lack of Clarity About Whether and When to Turn to Extratextual Canons 
 
Section V.A offered several examples of Justice Scalia’s commitment to 
deriving answers from statutory text. In contrast, this Section highlights a few 
examples of Scalia’s bankruptcy decisions where he deemed the text to be 
insufficient to yield a clear answer. In each case, the court undoubtedly reached what 
it believed to be the right answer, but the court was forced to embrace more than the 
plain text to get to that result. 
Perhaps the most innocuous example is Young v. United States.350 In Young, 
the Court faced the question of whether Chapter 13 debtors could discharge older 
tax debt.351 Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A), certain tax debts are 
nondischargeable.352 Among other such nondischargeable tax debts are those taxes 
that are also deemed to be priority debts: they are paid ahead of other nonpriority 
                                                      
347 See generally Kaplow, supra note 74, at 578–59 (explaining the role of precedent 
in analyzing the relative efficiencies of rules versus standards). 
348 See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 30, at 397–98 (noting that “rigorously principled 
decisionmaking may be too much to expect from any judges.”). 
349 See, e.g., Waldron & Berman, supra note 12, at 231 (deriding the implication that 
there is an “easy button” for statutory interpretation).  
350 535 U.S. 43 (2002). 
351 Id. at 44–45. 
352 Id. at 46. 
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creditors.353 The statutory provision regarding priority taxes creates a three-year 
lookback period under Section 507(a)(8)(A)(i).354 This apparently straightforward 
lookback period begins on the date that the petition is filed.355 But this creates a 
possible “loophole”356 in light of the fact that debtors can file multiple petitions, and 
Chapter 13 petitions typically remain pending for several years, during which time 
creditors (including the IRS) are prohibited from taking any collection action.357 
Thus, some enterprising debtors were filing Chapter 13 petitions, using the 
protections of the automatic stay until the statutory lookback period for taxes had 
passed, and then filing for Chapter 7.358 In that subsequent Chapter 7 bankruptcy, 
these debtors would then argue that by the time of their second petition, the back 
taxes were no longer within the three-year window, and therefore could be 
discharged.359  
A unanimous court rejected this debtor-friendly interpretation.360 In a decision 
authored by Justice Scalia, the Court held that the lookback provision in Section 
507(a)(8)(A)(i) was akin to a statute of limitations.361 In turn, equitable tolling is 
typically available for a statute of limitations.362 Bankruptcy courts are “courts of 
equity and ‘appl[y] the principles and rules of equity jurisprudence’”363 and here, 
equitable tolling was not clearly inconsistent with the Code.364 Therefore, the court 
concluded that lower courts should reject such efforts to use back-to-back petitions 
to make an end run around the three-year period.365  
Justice Scalia’s decision in Young makes several unsupported assumptions 
about congressional intent: namely, that Congress designed Section 507(a)(8)(A)(i) 
to be a statute of limitations,366 that Congress was aware of the “hornbook law”367 
that statutes of limitations are subject to equitable tolling,368 and that by including 
equitable tolling in other provisions of the Code, Congress did not intend to create a 
“negative inference”369 about the possibility of equitably tolling this particular 
lookback period.370  
  
                                                      
353 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
354 Young, 535 U.S. at 46. 
355 Id. 
356 Id. 
357 Id. The prohibition arises due to the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362. Id. at 46. 
358 Id. 
359 Id. at 46–47. 
360 See id. at 47.  
361 Id. at 47–48. 
362 See id. at 49–50. 
363 Id. at 50 (citing Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939)). 
364 See id. 
365 See id. at 50–51. 
366 See id. at 47–48.  
367 Id. at 49. 
368 Id. at 49–50. 
369 Id. at 52. 
370 See id. at 52–53. 
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Although this result is undoubtedly a fair one that prevents debtors from 
simultaneously taxing and exploiting the bankruptcy system, recall Justice Scalia’s 
admonition that “bankruptcy law has little to do with natural justice.”371 It’s not 
especially difficult to imagine Scalia in dissent in this case. Congress was 
undoubtedly aware that its statutory scheme created the possibility of serial filings, 
and in fact had included tolling provisions elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code. Why 
wouldn’t it be equally fair to assume that Congress intended to create clear, bright 
line rules about dischargeability of debt? Isn’t it possible to view the three-year 
lookback period as one that provides clarity to governments as well, helping them 
make more accurate projections about accounts receivable and encouraging them to 
devote resources more efficiently to current collection actions? And doesn’t it strain 
standard principles of interpretation to construe 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1) as a statute of 
limitations, when some of the other nondischargeability provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 
523 have explicit time-bars?372 These are just a few of the questions that a dissenter 
might have raised in objection to the result in Young, and they all sound very Scalia-
like.  
Another example where Scalia was willing to look beyond the straightforward 
textual command came in Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf.373 This decision 
involved the scope of the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362: does Congress’ 
broad prohibition against any act or action to collect a debt from the debtor or lay 
claim to property of the estate encompass a bank’s decision to place a temporary 
hold on debtor funds in which it may have an interest?374 A unanimous court 
concluded that this sort of administrative hold did not violate 11 U.S.C. § 362 
because it did not take property from the debtor nor did it amount to an exercise of 
dominion over property owned by the debtor.375 
Authoring the unanimous decision, Scalia went to great lengths to explain why 
the bank’s actions in this case were different from ordinary violations of the 
automatic stay:  
 
[W]e are unpersuaded by respondent’s additional contentions that the 
administrative hold violated §§ 362(a)(3) and 362(a)(6). . . . Respondent’s 
reliance on these provisions rests on the false premise that petitioner’s 
administrative hold took something from respondent, or exercised 
dominion over property that belonged to respondent. That view of things 
                                                      
371 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 435 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
372 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C)(i)(I) (2012) (“[C]onsumer debts owed to a single 
creditor and aggregating more than $500 for luxury goods or services incurred by an 
individual debtor on or within 90 days before the order for relief under this title are presumed 
to be nondischargeable . . . .”). Importantly, the Court’s conclusion that this was a statute of 
limitation was based in part on petitioners’ concession. Young, 535 U.S. at 47–48. Perhaps 
the decision would have been more difficult if petitioners had mounted a serious challenge 
to this foundational aspect of the decision. 
373 516 U.S. 16 (1995). 
374 Id. at 17–18. 
375 See id. at 19–21. 
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might be arguable if a bank account consisted of money belonging to the 
depositor and held by the bank. In fact, however, it consists of nothing 
more or less than a promise to pay, from the bank to the depositor, . . . and 
petitioner’s temporary refusal to pay was neither a taking of possession of 
respondent’s property nor an exercising of control over it, but merely a 
refusal to perform its promise.376 
 
As with Young, this result is undoubtedly logical. If banks were forced to 
immediately allow a debtor to withdraw monies on demand, then banks’ traditional 
rights of set-off would be rendered meaningless as a practical matter. But it is also 
easy to imagine Scalia in dissent, criticizing the majority for tap dancing around the 
straightforward protections of 11 U.S.C. § 362. It is even easier to imagine Scalia 
arguing that if Congress intended to create an exception to preserve banks’ rights to 
set-off, it could have done so alongside the twenty-eight other very detailed 
exceptions to 11 U.S.C. § 362.377 In fact, Justice Scalia made this precise argument 
in Law v. Siegel: “[t]he Code’s meticulous—not to say mind-numbingly detailed—
enumeration of exemptions and exceptions to those exemptions confirms that courts 
are not authorized to create additional exceptions.”378 
Both Young and Citizens Bank demonstrate that Scalia was willing to embrace 
nontextual alternatives to a straightforward reading of the words that Congress used 
in the Bankruptcy Code. This willingness in turn undermines the commitment to 
textual justice that Scalia demonstrated in cases like Dewsnup and Ransom. Even as 
Justice Scalia expressed, “the greatest sympathy for the Court of Appeals who must 
predict which manner of statutory construction we shall use for the next Bankruptcy 
Code case,”379 he was adding to the predictability problems by readily endorsing 
new exceptions. It is particularly challenging to take a principled stand as a rule-
based textualist while simultaneously writing decisions that speak of broader 
considerations that clearly go beyond the plain text of the Code. 
Undoubtedly, there are important and defensible reasons for Scalia’s departure 
from the straightforward text in these two cases. Nonetheless, his paeans to 
textualism might have had more impact with his colleagues and with lower courts if 
he had not authored decisions that opted to overlook the very concepts that he 
advocated for elsewhere. Perhaps his philosophy would have had broader impact if 
another justice had authored the lead opinion in these cases, allowing Justice Scalia 
to concur to explain specifically why he was departing from a more absolutist 
approach.380 But as the record stands, such decisions sent mixed messages to 
                                                      
376 Id. at 21 (citations omitted). 
377 To the contrary, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7) (2012) expressly extends the automatic stay 
to set-offs; a textualist could easily argue that the reference to “set-offs” in subsection (a) 
coupled with the failure to mention set-offs among the exceptions in subsection (b) 
demonstrates that Congress did not intend to create such an exception.  
378 Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188, 1196 (2014) (citations omitted). 
379 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 435 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
380 An example of such a concurrence is Justice Stevens’ concurrence in FCC v. 
NextWave Personal Communications Inc., 537 U.S. 293 (2003) in which he noted that the 
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bankruptcy judges and litigants who might otherwise have viewed Scalia as an 
unequivocal champion of clear and easy rules that derive solely from statutory 
text.381  
Finally, any critique of Justice Scalia’s commitment to textualism must address 
his dissent in Till v. SCS Credit Corp.382 The Supreme Court took up Till to resolve 
a circuit split about how to calculate the proper rate of interest when a debtor uses a 
Chapter 13 plan to pay a secured creditor over that creditor’s objections.383 Prior to 
the 2005 amendments in BAPCPA, Chapter 13 allowed car owners to restructure 
their car loans by reducing the repayment obligation to the present value of the car.384 
In Till, the Chapter 13 debtors wanted to pay off their car debt with added interest 
of 9.5% over the life of the plan, while the secured creditor argued for 21%—its 
typical rate for subprime lending that adequately reflected the risk that the debtors 
would not complete plan payments.385  
In the absence of any real guidance in the Code, lower courts devised a startling 
array of formulas for calculating the appropriate rate, ranging from the debtor-
friendly cost of funds rate to a creditor-friendly forced loan rate.386 In Till, a plurality 
opinion authored by Justice Stevens endorsed the relatively debtor-friendly formula 
rate, instructing bankruptcy courts to charge the prime rate plus some additional 
percentage to account for the specific risk that the debtor would not follow through 
with the Chapter 13 plan.387 The plurality noted that the typical risk adjustment for 
courts following the formula rate was in the range of 1–3%.388 Accordingly, it held 
that the debtors’ proposal to pay 9.5%—the prime rate of 8% plus a risk adjustment 
of 1.5%—was appropriate.389  
Strenuously disagreeing, Justice Scalia penned a four-justice dissent that 
argued for the presumptive contract rate. In his view, the bankruptcy courts’ inquiry 
should always begin with the contract rate to which the parties had agreed, leaving 
open the possibility that either party could argue for a higher or lower rate depending 
                                                      
application of 11 U.S.C. § 525 to the FCC’s license cancellation presented a “close case[ ]” 
and explained why he was siding with the majority. NextWave, 537 U.S. at 308–10 (Stevens, 
J., concurring).  
381 See Waldron & Berman, supra note 12, at 202 (noting the absence of “a consistent 
methodology that can be assuredly applied by the lower courts” in the Supreme Court’s 
recent bankruptcy jurisprudence); see also id. at 231 (explaining that while a “magic tool” 
or “easy button” for statutory interpretation might be desirable, no such device exists). 
382 541 U.S. 465, 491 (2004). 
383 The rate of interest is known as the “cram-down” rate, a colorful phrase that draws 
on the notion that the plan has been “crammed down” the creditor’s throat.  
384 The ability to strip down car loans to present value was limited in 2005 with the so-
called “hanging paragraph” that follows 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(9) (2012). The BAPCPA 
amendment prevents Chapter 13 debtors from stripping down liens on cars that they have 
owned for less than 910 days (approximately two-and-a-half years).  
385 See Till, 541 U.S. at 471. 
386 Id. at 473–74. 
387 See id. at 478–79.  
388 Id. at 480. 
389 See id. 
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on the circumstances.390 He contended that this was the best way to maximize 
efficiency while ensuring that secured creditors were not systematically 
undercompensated for risk, given the high rate of failure of Chapter 13 plans.391 For 
the Chapter 13 debtors in Till, this meant that the default would be to continue to 
pay the 21% interest to which they had originally agreed.392 In turn, this creditor-
friendly default meant that the Tills and many other subprime borrowers would 
likely be unable to confirm a Chapter 13 plan that involved keeping their car. 
But Justice Scalia was only able to convince three other justices to support his 
proposal.393 Indeed, it was Justice Thomas who broke ranks with his conservative 
colleagues and gave the necessary fifth vote to the debtors.394 In a concurrence that 
focuses on the plain text of 11 U. S. C. § 1325(a)(5)(B), Justice Thomas argued that 
all of approaches spawned by the lower courts were wrong. According to Justice 
Thomas, the mistake was that each approach incorrectly focuses on how to value the 
debtor’s promise to pay a certain amount over the life of the plan; in contrast, this 
provision of Chapter 13 only requires the debtor to pay the value of the property.395 
In other words, the Code requires no risk adjustment at all. Because the debtors’ 
offer to pay 9.5% interest was overly generous and therefore unobjectionable, 
Justice Thomas gave the necessary fifth vote for plan confirmation to the debtors in 
Till.396 
For bankruptcy practitioners, Till did not provide much clarity or certainty.397 
The plurality decision in Till only spawned more confusion in the bankruptcy world, 
with most courts refusing to apply its logic in Chapter 11 cases, and some even 
refusing to apply it in Chapter 13 cases.398 The decision’s main significance is as an 
example of Justice Scalia’s willingness to engage in the very act of policy-making 
that he typically argued should be left to Congress. Moreover, in perhaps the ultimate 
irony, it is a case in which Justice Thomas stood alone in his advocacy of a textual 
solution that would have provided the maximum clarity to lower courts and the 
maximum predictability to litigants. As such, Till raised questions about Justice 
Scalia’s overall commitment to textualism, and to predictable outcomes for that 
matter.399  
                                                      
390 See id. at 498–99 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
391 See id. at 500. 
392 See id. at 472 (plurality opinion). 
393 Id. at 491 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor 
and Kennedy joined the dissent. Id. 
394 Id. at 485 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
395 Id. 
396 See id. at 485. 
397 See Dembart & Markell, supra note 12, at 384–85 (“[W]hile the Court may have 
ably decided [Till v. SCS Credit Corp.], it hasn’t left those in the courtroom or the boardroom 
much certainty about how to apply the case in the future.”). 
398 See Austin, supra note 63, at 1119–22; see also Waldron & Berman, supra note 12, 
at 197 n.13 (expressing agreement with Justice Scalia’s candid comment that the decision in 
Till “[was] unlikely to burnish the Court’s reputation for reasoned decisionmaking”). 
399 See, e.g., Miranda McGowan, Do as I Do, Not as I Say: An Empirical Investigation 
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B.  The Lack of Clarity About the Impact of Pre-Bankruptcy Practice 
 
Another area in which Justice Scalia sent mixed messages is with the role of 
pre-Code practice. Arguments about pre-Code practice started to emerge shortly 
after Congress enacted the sweeping Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Where 
Congress had not spoken directly and unequivocally to an issue, litigants would 
point to decisional law predating the Code and argue that Congress did not intend to 
disrupt existing practices.400 By the time Justice Scalia arrived on the Court in fall 
1986, the Court had already embraced the notion that pre-Code practice should 
influence its interpretation of the Code.401 As the Court explained in Midlantic 
National Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection,402 “[t]he normal 
rule of statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the 
interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific.”403 
However, no coherent doctrine had yet emerged for whether and when the Court 
ought to consider pre-Code practice alongside textual evidence.404 Thus, Justice 
Scalia was in a prime position to help shape the Court’s jurisprudence regarding the 
proper role of pre-Code practice. But his writings in this area provide mixed 
guidance at best. 
Justice Scalia had plenty of opportunities to address the role of pre-Code 
practices. In fact, in one of his earliest decisions, United Savings Ass’n v. Timbers 
of Inwood Forest Associates,405 his conclusion derived in part from the pre-Code 
practice of denying postpetition interest to undersecured creditors.406 In rejecting the 
petitioner’s arguments in favor of a more generous reading of the relevant statutory 
provisions, he pointed to the absence of any evidence that Congress intended to 
                                                      
of Justice Scalia’s Ordinary Meaning Method of Statutory Interpretation, 78 MISS. L.J. 129, 
184 (2008) (arguing that Justice Scalia’s dissent in Till deployed a common tactic of 
attributing a purpose to statutory language without any evidence); see also Dembart & 
Markell, supra note 12, at 385 (arguing that with unhelpful decisions like Till, the Court 
evidenced “disdain or even mild hostility to or an unfamiliarity with the day-to-day 
operations of the bankruptcy courts.”).  
400 See, e.g., Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 500–01 
(1986) (pointing to three lower court decisions as evidence that “the trustee’s abandonment 
power had been limited by a judicially developed doctrine intended to protect legitimate state 
or federal interests” and reasoning that Congress could not have intended to disrupt this 
doctrine in enacting 11 U.S.C. § 554).  
401 See id. at 501. 
402 474 U.S. 494 (1986). 
403 Id. at 501 (citing Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 
266–67 (1979)). 
404 Compare id. at 500–01 (relying on three lower court decisions to establish pre-Code 
practice), with United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 249–53 (1989) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority had given short shrift to a pre-Code 
practice that had been followed by the Supreme Court as well as every Court of Appeals to 
consider the issue, based solely on where Congress had opted to place a comma). 
405 484 U.S. 365 (1988). For more on Timbers, see supra Section V.A. 
406 Timbers, 484 U.S. at 373. 
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change pre-Code practices.407 In a rare reference to legislative history, he wrote: “a 
major change in the existing rules would not likely have been made without specific 
provision in the text of the statute . . . ; it is most improbable that it would have been 
made without even any mention in the legislative history.”408 
In other bankruptcy cases, Justice Scalia took a hard line about the role of pre-
Code practice.409 For example, in Dewsnup and RadLAX, both discussed above in 
Section V, Justice Scalia appeared to be endorsing a bright-line rule for lower courts: 
arguments about pre-Code practice must yield to the straightforward commands of 
the text that Congress enacted.410 Such a bright-line rule would reduce litigation and 
promote certainty. But as it turns out, Justice Scalia was not the best advocate for a 
bright-line rule either. 
The clearest example of Scalia’s equivocation about the role of pre-Code 
practice comes in the 5-4 decision in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.411 There, the 
Court faced a tricky question regarding the scope of a trustee’s powers to invalidate 
(or, in bankruptcy parlance, “avoid”) certain recent transactions involving the 
debtor’s property.412 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) authorizes a trustee to undo so-called 
“fraudulent transfers,”413 in which transactions involving debtor property during the 
two years leading up to the bankruptcy filing are deemed fraudulent as a matter of 
law if the debtor received less than a reasonably equivalent value.414 This very broad 
avoidance power appears to come into direct conflict with the foreclosure laws of 
states that allow forced sales of property, as the price paid in a forced sale is often 
much lower than what a buyer would pay on the open market.415 The question that 
divided the Court in BFP was whether and when a trustee could undo the results of 
a state foreclosure sale conducted within the two years leading up to bankruptcy.416  
                                                      
407 Id. at 373–74. 
408 Id. at 380. This line of reasoning is also significant for its reference to legislative 
history: for all of Scalia’s bluster about refusing to consider what was in the legislative 
history to interpret statutory text, he was nonetheless willing to draw conclusions based on 
what was absent from the legislative history. In a striking bit of irony, the Solicitor General’s 
brief in Dewnsup relied on this passage from Timbers to support the proposition that 
Congress could not have intended to radically change the pre-Code expectation that secured 
claims ordinarily pass through bankruptcy unaltered. See Brief for the Respondents at 23, 
Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992) (No. 90-741). 
409 See, e.g., Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 435 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(pointing to an earlier decision in which the Court had “deemed the pre-Code practice to be 
irrelevant.”); RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 649 
(2012) (“As for pre-Code practices, they can be relevant to the interpretation of an ambiguous 
text, but we find no textual ambiguity here.”). 
410 See supra Sections V.B, V.D. 
411 511 U.S. 531 (1994).  
412 See id. at 533–34. BFP involved a Chapter 11 debtor in possession seeking to use 
the avoiding powers of a trustee as authorized by 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a). Id. at 534. 
413 See id. at 535. 
414 See id (citation omittted). 
415 Id. at 537–38. 
416 Id. at 552 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
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The courts of appeals devised a variety of ways to approach this issue. For 
example, the Fifth Circuit adopted what became known as the Durrett rule, holding 
that a foreclosure sale would be invalidated if it were less than 70% of fair market 
value.417 The Seventh Circuit endorsed a case-by-case approach, in which a 
foreclosure sale created a presumption of reasonably equivalent value that the trustee 
could rebut with specific evidence.418 Other circuits rejected this inquiry altogether, 
holding that the price paid in a noncollusive state law foreclosure constituted 
“reasonably equivalent value” for the purposes of fraudulent transfer analysis under 
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2).419 
Justice Scalia wrote for the slender five-justice majority, siding with the latter 
group of courts.420 He rejected the notion that bankruptcy law distinguishes between 
forced sale value and fair market value.421 In his view, the laws of fraudulent transfer 
and foreclosure had enjoyed “peaceful co-existence” for 400 years; there was no 
indication in the Code that Congress had intended to “disrupt th[is] ancient 
harmony.”422   
In stark contrast to his Dewsnup dissent two years earlier, where Scalia 
criticized the majority for elevating pre-Code practice above the plain meaning of 
the text, BFP featured a four-justice dissent that accused Scalia of the very same 
flawed logic.423 Interestingly, the author of the BFP dissent was Justice Souter, who 
alone joined Justice Scalia’s scathing dissent in Dewnsup; and, in the ultimate irony, 
Justice Souter drew on many of the same themes that Justice Scalia had used to 
criticize his colleagues just two years earlier.424  
Souter’s dissent began by arguing that the text of Section 548(a)(2) was clear, 
with the apparent subtext being that Scalia was breaking his own rule regarding pre-
Code practice.425 Souter next explained that there were good reasons why Congress 
would have wanted trustees to use Section 548 to up-end the results of state 
foreclosure sales: “it surely is plausible that Congress, in drafting the Bankruptcy 
Code, would find it intolerable that a debtor’s assets be wasted and the bankruptcy 
estate diminished, solely to speed a mortgagee’s recovery.”426 Souter then criticized 
the majority for its faithlessness to the text: “[c]onfronted with the eminent sense of 
the natural reading, the Court seeks finally to place this case in a line of 
                                                      
417 See Durrett v. Wash. Nat. Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 203–04 (5th Cir. 1980). 
418 See In re Bundles, 856 F.2d 815, 824–25 (7th Cir. 1988). 
419 See, e.g., In re Winshall Settlor’s Trust, 758 F.2d 1136, 1139 (6th Cir. 1985) 
(holding that the price paid in a non-collusive state law foreclosure constituted “reasonably 
equivalent value”). This was also the position taken by the Ninth Circuit in its decision 
below. In re BFP, 974 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 1992). 
420 BFP, 511 U.S. at 548–49. 
421 Id. at 537–38. 
422 Id. at 542–43. 
423 Id. at 565–66 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
424 Compare Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 420–36 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting), 
with BFP, 511 U.S. at 549–70 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
425 BFP, 511 U.S. at 566 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
426 Id. at 564–65. 
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decisions . . . in which we have held that something more than mere plain language 
is required.”427 Finally, in perhaps the ultimate rebuke to his Dewsnup co-dissenter, 
Souter concluded: 
 
Like the Court, I understand this case to involve a choice between two 
possible statutory provisions . . . . But that choice is not ours to make, for 
Congress made it in 1984, by enacting the former alternative into law and 
not the latter. Without some indication that doing so would frustrate 
Congress’s clear intention or yield patent absurdity, our obligation is to 
apply the statute as Congress wrote it.428 
 
Thanks to Justice Souter’s pointed dissent, the contrast between Scalia’s 
approach in Dewsnup and BFP could not be starker. Undoubtedly, Scalia’s about-
face was motivated in part by federalism concerns.429 Indeed, one factor not present 
in Dewsnup is Scalia’s argument that federal law should not be lightly read to 
interfere with important state interests like the validity of real estate title.430 There 
are also obvious efficiency benefits of a bright line rule that treats judicial 
foreclosures as final.431  
Nonetheless, setting aside the merits of these counterarguments, the BFP 
descision created the perception that Justice Scalia was willing to rewrite the rules 
of his rule-based textualism.432 This perception may have undermined the rule-based 
approach he had so recently advocated in cases like Timbers and Dewsnup, 
especially among lower court judges tasked with applying the rules.433 It is not easy 
being a rule-based textualist, but it is even harder to cultivate adherents to a 
particular philosophy when colleagues accuse you of abandoning the very principles 
that underlie that philosophy. 
Justice Scalia was a bit more circumspect about the role of pre-Code practice 
in Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank,434 which addressed 
                                                      
427 Id. at 565.  
428 Id. at 570. 
429 Id. at 543–44 (majority opinion); see also Nickolai G. Levin, Constitutional 
Statutory Synthesis, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1281, 1366–68 (2003) (describing the role federalism 
played in BFP). 
430 BFP, 511 U.S. at 544. 
431 Despite the efficiency benefits, the merits of the textual argument are questionable. 
Congress does defer to state law in other provisions of the Code. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 544 
(2017) (incorporating state substantive law regarding recording statutes and fraudulent 
transfers). As another example, in determining how foreclosures of federal interests should 
be handled, Congress created a statutory scheme that largely defers to state processes. See 
generally 28 U.S.C. § 2410 (2017) (describing actions affecting property on which the 
United States has a lien). 
432 See Dembart & Markell, supra note 12, at 390–91 (citing Justice Scalia’s decision 
in BFP as evidence that plain meaning is not a coherent standalone doctrine and instead will 
always “share the stage with extra-textual sources”). 
433 See id. 
434 530 U.S. 1 (2000). 
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whether a nontrustee could use 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) to recover administrative 
expenses.435 Although the petitioner pointed to pre-Code practices authorizing such 
recovery, Scalia’s unanimous opinion questioned whether this practice was 
“sufficiently widespread and well recognized to justify the conclusion of implicit 
adoption by the Code”436 and expressed doubt that this was “the type of rule 
that . . . Congress was aware of when enacting the Code.”437 He concluded, “[i]n any 
event, while pre-Code practice ‘informs our understanding of the language of the 
Code,’ it cannot overcome that language. It is a tool of construction, not an 
extratextual supplement.”438 
Although Scalia’s opinion in Hartford Underwriters did not draw a dissent, 
one can imagine that a colleague inspired enough to challenge the result would find 
an easy target in the seeming inconsistency regarding whether and when pre-Code 
practice will be significant. The sporadic indulgence of pre-Code practice appears 
to be at odds with two beneficial aspects of Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence. First, it 
requires litigants to fill the record with evidence of pre-Code practice in the hopes 
that the court will find the text ambiguous enough to consider it, thereby increasing 
litigation costs. Second, it depends on judicial assessment of whether the practice 
might have been “widespread”439 enough to be relevant. This loose test is 
particularly problematic in light of the argument that a sufficiently widespread pre-
Code practice is more likely to have been directly addressed by Congress in the 
statute.440 Thus, these sorts of judicial assessments about the importance of pre-Code 
practice can easily start to resemble the “sheer judicial power-grab[s]”441 that Justice 
Scalia complained of elsewhere.442 
The issue of pre-Code practices highlights a tension in Scalia’s judicial 
philosophy: on the one hand, his originalist approach to constitutional interpretation 
compels him to consider Constitution-era practices in order to inform his 
understanding of the constitutional text. So on many levels, it makes perfect sense 
to consider creditor-debtor practices in 1978 to inform his understanding of the 
Bankruptcy Code. Yet at the same time, considering these practices requires some 
indication that Congress was aware of them, which blends into the sort of questions 
about legislative intent that Scalia was so adamant that the Court should avoid. This 
creates a paradox as demonstrated early on with Justice Scalia’s unusual reference 
to legislative history in his Timbers opinion.443 Scalia’s checkered indulgence of pre-
Code practice arguments further reflects the difficulty in resolving this tension, and 
                                                      
435 Id. at 4–5. 
436 Id. at 10. 
437 Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). 
438 Id. (citation omitted). 
439 Id. 
440 See, e.g., BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 553–54 (1994) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (noting that Congress did address certain aspects of state foreclosure law in its 
1984 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code). 
441 SCALIA, supra note 18, at 29. 
442 Id. 
443 For a full discussion of Timbers, see supra Section V.A. 
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appears to have created doubt among his colleagues—as well as among lower 
courts—about his commitment to clear and straightforward interpretive methods.444 
 
C.  Occasional Acquiescence in the Use of Legislative History 
 
Section V.C above catalogues the variety of methods that Justice Scalia 
employed to try to dissuade his colleagues from relying on, or even citing legislative 
history. Given his ardent stance against its use, one might expect that Justice Scalia 
would consistently chide his colleagues for using it. However, this was not the case. 
Over the years, Scalia signed onto several unanimous bankruptcy decisions that 
relied on legislative history. 
For example, in the 1988 case of Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers,445 the 
Court had to decide whether the debtors, as family farmers, would be able to keep 
their farm even though unsecured creditors would not be paid in full.446 Creditors 
argued that this outcome was barred by the absolute priority rule, a rule that was first 
articulated in nineteenth century case law and was eventually codified in the 1978 
Code.447 But a divided Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed,448 relying on the 
Supreme Court’s 1939 decision in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products,449 which 
appeared to leave the door open for exceptions to the absolute priority rule where 
the debtor had invested “money or money’s worth” to the new enterprise.450 
Applying this principle, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the debtors’ ongoing 
contributions of “labor, expertise, and experience over the life of the plan”451 
represented “money’s worth”452 that allowed them to retain the farm despite not 
paying creditors in full.453 
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed.454 Writing for the Court, Justice 
White explained that the language in Los Angeles Lumber was dicta, and that the 
decision itself foreclosed the result that the Eighth Circuit had reached.455 As part of 
his decision, Justice White turned to the legislative history of the 1978 Act, noting 
that its drafters had rejected a proposal that would create an exception to the absolute 
priority rule for certain equity holders.456 He then quoted the House Report’s 
statement that Section 1129(b) “codifies the absolute priority rule for the dissenting 
                                                      
444 See Waldron & Berman, supra note 12, at 211. 
445 485 U.S. 197 (1988). 
446 Id. at 199–202. 
447 Id. at 201. 
448 Id. at 201–02. 
449 308 U.S. 106 (1939). 
450 In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388, 401–02 (8th Cir. 1986) (quoting Case, 308 U.S. at 122). 
451 Id. at 403. 
452 Id. at 402. 
453 Id. at 403. 
454 Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 199 (1988). 
455 Id. at 203. 
456 Id. at 205–06. 
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class on down.”457 This discussion of legislative history drew nary a peep from 
Justice Scalia, who was then a relative newcomer to the Court.458 
A few terms later, the Supreme Court decided the case of Johnson v. Home 
State Bank,459 which presented the question of whether a debtor who had already 
received a discharge under Chapter 7 could then list his mortgage as a “claim” to be 
paid through a Chapter 13 plan.460 The Court of Appeals agreed with the lender’s 
argument that the only “claim” for the purposes of bankruptcy was the bank’s ability 
to proceed in personam against the debtor.461 However, a unanimous Supreme Court 
disagreed, holding that the definition of “claim” in 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) also included 
the bank’s in rem action against the property.462 The unanimous decision authored 
by Justice Marshall went into great detail about the legislative history surrounding 
not only the definition of claim in the 1978 Code, but also the definition in the 
predecessor statute, as well as the legislative history of the rules of construction for 
the Code contained in 11 U.S.C. § 102(2).463 As with Ahlers, Justice Scalia made no 
objection to this legislative history discussion.464 
These two examples bookending Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Begier465 
demonstrate that Justice Scalia was not consistent in making his objections to 
legislative history.466 His occasional silence on the use of legislative history may 
have tacitly encouraged its continued use by litigants and lower courts. On the other 
hand, Justice Scalia’s express reliance on legislative history in Timbers is more 
confounding. 
As discussed above in Section V.A, Timbers presented the question of whether 
the pre-Code practice of denying postpetition interest to undersecured creditors 
should continue under the 1978 Code. As explained above, Timbers is a striking 
example of Justice Scalia’s efforts to ascertain objective intent through holistic 
interpretation of statutory text.467 But, in rejecting the petitioner’s argument that pre-
Code practice of denying interest to undersecured creditors was changed by the 1978 
Code, Justice Scalia broke his own rules by looking at legislative history—or in this 
case what was not in the legislative history.468 Specifically, he explained that he 
would expect that such a major change to pre-Code practice would have been 
addressed in the legislative history.469 This particular use of legislative history has 
                                                      
457 Id. at 206 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 413 
(1977)). 
458 Id. at 198. 
459 501 U.S. 78 (1991). 
460 Id. at 80–81. 
461 Id. at 84. 
462 Id. at 85. 
463 Id. at 85–87. 
464 Id. at 79. 
465 Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53 (1990). 
466 See supra Section V.C. 
467 See supra Section V.A. 
468 See supra Section VI.B. 
469 United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 
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been described as “the Sherlock Holmes canon,”470 and Justice Scalia has been 
criticized for relying on it in cases like Timbers while deriding its use in other 
decisions.471  
In sum, Justice Scalia’s occasional ambivalence about the use of legislative 
history is curious given the passion that he often shows in combatting it. Perhaps 
Justice Scalia’s position on legislative history has evolved over time.472 
Nevertheless, the fact that he ran hot and cold on this subject is a weak spot in his 
overall commitment to a rule-based textualism that would promote clarity and 
predictability in bankruptcy law. 
 
D.  Unpredictable Dictum 
 
A final limitation on Justice Scalia’s advocacy for clear and predictable rules 
was his occasional willingness to depart from precedent. Lower courts are bound to 
follow Supreme Court precedent, so one way in which the Supreme Court can 
promote clarity and certainty is to implement its own past decisions clearly and 
unequivocally.473 But as with his inconsistency on statutory interpretation questions, 
Justice Scalia sent mixed messages about the importance of stare decisis to 
bankruptcy law. 
At times he took a very strong stand in favor of stare decisis. For example, in 
Hubbard v. United States,474 the court faced a question that tied bankruptcy law to 
criminal law: does 18 U.S.C. § 1001 criminalize false statements made in a 
bankruptcy proceeding?475 Section 1001 is an expansive statute that criminalizes a 
range of false statements to government officials, and courts have frequently 






                                                      
380 (1988) (“[I]t is most improbable that [such a major change in the existing rules] would 
have been made without even any mention in the legislative history.”).  
470 See Anita Krishnakumar, The Sherlock Holmes Canon, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 
2 (2016) (“Colorfully referred to as the ‘dog that did not bark’ canon after a Sherlock Holmes 
story in which a watchdog failed to bark while a racehorse was stolen, the interpretive 
presumption . . . [is that] a lack of congressional comment regarding a significant change can 
be taken as evidence that Congress did not intend that interpretation.”). 
471 Id. at 16. 
472 See SCALIA, supra note 18, at 36 (noting in 1997 that he had not used legislative 
history to decide a case in the past nine terms). 
473 See Clark, supra note 112, at 32 (explaining that creating more binding precedent is 
an efficient way to promote uniformity in bankruptcy outcomes).  
474 514 U.S. 695 (1995). 
475 Id. at 697. 
476 Id. at 699. 
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bankruptcy court was considered a federal “department” or “agency” within the 
meaning of Section 1001.477 The lower courts had concluded that the answer was 
yes, relying on United States v. Bramblett,478 a forty-year-old decision interpreting 
Section 1001 very broadly to encompass all three branches of the government.479   
By a 6-3 vote, a majority of the Supreme Court overruled Bramblett and 
concluded that a bankruptcy court is not a “department” or “agency” within the 
meaning of Section 1001.480 At the heart of the majority opinion was the view that 
conflicting lines of case law had carved out too many confusing exceptions to 
Bramblett, such that the more principled approach was simply to overrule it.481 The 
voting lines in Hubbard exposed an unusual alliance between liberal and 
conservative justices, with Justice Scalia joining Justice Stevens’ opinion along with 
Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer; meanwhile, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s dissent was joined by Justices O’Connor and Souter.  
Perhaps in light of this unusual division, Justice Scalia also penned a 
concurrence to explain the importance of stare decisis and his particular reasons for 
departing from it in this instance.482 He began with a stirring defense of the doctrine 
of stare decisis: 
 
The doctrine of stare decisis protects the legitimate expectations of those 
who live under the law, and, as Alexander Hamilton observed, is one of 
the means by which exercise of “an arbitrary discretion in the courts” is 
restrained, The Federalist No. 78, p. 471 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Who 
ignores it must give reasons, and reasons that go beyond mere 
demonstration that the overruled opinion was wrong (otherwise the 
doctrine would be no doctrine at all).483 
 
Scalia believed that there were significant reasons to depart from the broad 
interpretation given to Section 1001 in Bramblett: namely the “demonstration, over 
time, that Bramblett has unacceptable consequences.”484 These consequences 
included a great “potential for mischief federal judges have discovered”485 in 
Bramblett’s overly broad reading of Section 1001.486 In Scalia’s view, the Court’s 
holding in Bramblett that “department” applied to all three branches of government 
was dicta, as the sole question before the Court was whether the statute applied to 
an executive agency.487 
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479 Hubbard, 514 U.S. at 702. 
480 Id. at 715. 
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487 Id. at 717. 
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This concurrence likely only invigorated the dissent, which sharply criticized 
the majority for disposing of forty-year-old precedent. In Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
view, this Court’s departure was nothing short of radical.488 His dissent went on to 
highlight the practical problems that the Court’s decision to jettison Bramblett would 
entail: 
 
The principle of stare decisis is designed to promote stability and certainty 
in the law. While most often invoked to justify a court’s refusal to 
reconsider its own decisions, it applies a fortiori to enjoin lower courts to 
follow the decision of a higher court. This principle is so firmly established 
in our jurisprudence that no lower court would deliberately refuse to 
follow the decision of a higher court.  
 
. . . . 
 
One of the consequences of [the Supreme Court’s] highly selective 
standard for granting review is that this Court is deprived of a very 
important means of assuring that the courts of appeals adhere to its 
precedents. It is all the more important, therefore, that no actual 
inducements to ignore these precedents be offered to the courts of appeals. 
But today’s decision is just such an inducement; it tells courts of appeals 
that if they build up a body of case law contrary to ours, their case law will 
serve as a basis for overruling our precedent. It is difficult to imagine a 
more topsy-turvy doctrine than this, or one more likely to unsettle 
established legal rules that the doctrine of stare decisis is designed to 
protect.489 
 
Hubbard may be an extreme example in that it involved forty years of 
precedent that sprung up like weeds thanks to fertile decisional language that was 
undoubtedly dicta. But a more nuanced example of how Justice Scalia drew the line 
between stare decisis and dicta came in U.S. Bank Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall 
Partnership.490 The Supreme Court had originally taken the case to address an 
important (and still unresolved) question in Chapter 11 bankruptcies: is there a “new 
value exception” 491 to the absolute priority rule? However, the much hoped-for 
clarity in Chapter 11 did not materialize.492 After briefing on the merits, the parties 
                                                      
488 Id. at 720 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
489 Id. at 719–21. 
490 513 U.S. 18 (1994). 
491 See Dembart & Markel, supra note 12, at 381 (criticizing the Court for repeatedly 
dodging the issue and noting that “[v]eterans of the ‘new value’ wars can often be heard 
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492 See, e.g., Harvey R. Miller, John J. Rapisardi & Reginald A. Greene, Leaving Old 
Questions Unanswered and Raising New Ones: The Supreme Court Furthers the New Value 
Controversy in Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass’n v. 203 North LaSalle Street 
Partnership, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 553, 573–74 (2000) (explaining that the Supreme Court 
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settled the matter and requested that the Ninth Circuit decision adopting the 
exception be vacated.493 At that point, the question before the Supreme Court 
changed from a substantive issue of bankruptcy law to a broader issue of judicial 
procedure: should the Supreme Court vacate the lower court’s decision after the 
parties mooted the appeal by settling?494 
The procedural question appeared easy in light of the Supreme Court’s 1950 
decision in United States v. Munsingwear, Inc.,495 which described vacatur for 
mootness as an “established practice”496 when one party requests it. A unanimous 
Supreme Court disagreed and held that voluntary mootness through settlement will 
not ordinarily be a basis for granting vacatur.497 In distinguishing the “leading case 
on vacatur,”498 Justice Scalia described its key language as dicta that did not justify 
its application here: 
 
But Munsingwear, and the post-Munsingwear practice, cannot bear the 
weight of the present case. To begin with, the portion of Justice Douglas’ 
opinion in Munsingwear describing the “established practice” for vacatur 
was dictum; all that was needful for the decision was (at most) the 
proposition that vacatur should have been sought, not that it necessarily 
would have been granted.499 
 
The decision goes on to discuss various policy issues that should inform courts’ 
exercise of its equitable powers.500 As with Hubbard, this discussion indicates that 
Justice Scalia had no problem relegating precedential language to the dustbin of 
dictum when there were good policy reasons to do so. 
  
                                                      
deepended the confusion over the new value exception by “intimat[ing] its continued 
vitality” in U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership). 
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495 340 U.S. 36 (1950). 
496 Id. at 39. 
497 Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 29. 
498 Id. at 22. 
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National Trust & Savings Association v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership. See, e.g., 
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Another nuanced and perhaps more troubling example comes via Justice 
Scalia’s decision in Law v. Siegel.501 In that closely watched case, the Supreme Court 
was asked to review the proper scope of a bankruptcy court’s equitable powers under 
11 U.S.C. § 105,502 a question that it had ruled on directly only seven years earlier 
in Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts.503  
In Marrama, a five-justice majority held that a bankruptcy court had authority 
to deny a debtor the right to convert a bankruptcy petition from Chapter 7 to Chapter 
13 in order to prevent an abuse of process.504 In reaching this conclusion, the 
majority rejected the debtor’s assertion that Section 706(a) created an unequivocal 
statutory right to conversion.505 
Justice Scalia joined the dissent in Marrama, which argued that Section 706 
expressly gave Chapter 7 debtors an absolute right to convert a case to Chapter 13.506 
In the dissent’s view, the majority should not allow bankruptcy judges to use their 
equitable powers under Section 105 to stray from clear statutory commands.507 
But just seven years later, in Law v. Siegel, Justice Scalia found himself writing 
a unanimous opinion that vindicated the dissent’s view that bankruptcy judges do 
not have authority to issue orders that are inconsistent with the commands of the 
Code.508 In Law, the trustee was seeking to be paid from assets that would ordinarily 
be paid to the debtor.509 In arguing that the debtor’s extreme misconduct justified 
such a result, the trustee relied heavily on the Court’s recent decision in Marrama, 
arguing that the majority had given bankruptcy court’s carte blanche to issue orders 
in order to prevent an abuse of process.510 But Justice Scalia’s opinion declined to 
read the seven-year-old case as binding precedent, distinguishing its key language 
as dicta: “[t]rue, the Court in Marrama also opined that the Bankruptcy Court’s 
refusal to convert the case was authorized under § 105(a) and might have been 
authorized under the court’s inherent powers. But even that dictum does not support 
[the trustee’s] position.”511 
The view that this language was no more than dicta rested on the Marrama 
majority’s notion that the text of the particular statutory provision—Section 706—
                                                      
501 See supra Section V.D. 
502 Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188, 1194 (2014). 
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was ambiguous, a proposition with which Scalia and the other dissenters strongly 
disagreed.512 Yet now, in a curious twist of logic, he dodged the holding of Marrama 
by taking the opposite position: because the language of Section 706 was 
ambiguous, it was acceptable in that case to allow the bankruptcy court to stray from 
the statutory text.513  
There were certainly good reasons for Justice Scalia to take the Marrama 
majority’s decision at its word. Indeed, because three justices who joined the 
Marrama majority were still on the Court,514 Justice Scalia’s uncritical acceptance 
of Marrama’s statutory analysis likely allowed for a unanimous decision. However, 
Justice Scalia’s overt about-face regarding the ambiguity of Section 706 risked 
feeding the impression that the Justice was more opportunistic than principled.  
The sense that there is some opportunism in Scalia’s dismissive use of the 
“dicta” label is perhaps heightened by Scalia’s occasional use of dicta to possibly 
shape or impact the future of bankruptcy law.515 One might expect that a justice who 
was so quick to distinguish overbroad language in a decision from what was 
necessary to actually decide an issue might have been very cautious in his own 
writing.516 But this does not appear to have been the case. In fact, Scalia occasionally 
took his own opportunities to place Easter Eggs in his own bankruptcy writings. 
One such example appears in his concurrence in Stern v. Marshall, the Supreme 
Court’s 2010 decision that attempted to outline the proper scope of a bankruptcy 
court’s authority to issue final decisions.517 After criticizing the majority for overly 
complicating the analysis and creating a test that creates uncertainty for lower courts 
and litigants, he ended with this head-turning suggestion: 
 
Perhaps historical practice permits non-Article III judges to process claims 
against the bankruptcy estate, see, e.g., Plank, Why Bankruptcy Judges 
Need Not and Should Not Be Article III Judges, 72 AM. BANKR.L.J. 567, 
607–609 (1998); the subject has not been briefed, and so I state no position 
on the matter. But Vickie points to no historical practice that authorizes a 
non-Article III judge to adjudicate a counterclaim of the sort at issue 
here.518 
  
                                                      
512 Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 377 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
513 Law, 134 S. Ct. at 1197. 
514 Marrama was authored by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices Souter, Kennedy, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer. Marrama, 549 U.S. at 366. The latter three were still on the Court 
when Law was decided in 2014.  
515 See Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 309 (1991). 
516 See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 49, at 576 (relaying Justice Scalia’s comment that 
“the most important thing he did as a Justice was to keep out of his colleague’s opinions 
language that could cause trouble in the future.”). 
517 See supra Section V.D. 
518 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 504–05 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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It is hard to imagine any better way to introduce complexity and uncertainty into 
constitutional doctrine than encouraging future litigants to brief and argue the 
possible role of historical practices in the understanding of Article III.519 This seems 
to undermine his admonition to the majority to keep things simple for the lower 
courts by sticking to the text of Article III.  
Justice Scalia’s indulgence in such musings was not limited to concurrences 
and dissents. One noteworthy example is his decision in Owen v. Owen,520 a case 
regarding the proper scope of the Florida homestead exemption.521 Owen involved a 
complicated factual and legal tug of war between a debtor who wanted to claim a 
condominium as exempt property and an ex-spouse who held a judicial lien by virtue 
of a marital property division.522 The precise question was whether 11 U.S.C. § 
522(f) allows a debtor to void a judicial lien on homestead property that became 
exempt after the judicial lien attached to it, when state law provides that the 
exemption does not impact pre-existing liens.523 In an eight-justice majority 
authored by Justice Scalia, the Court agreed that the judicial lien could be invalidated 
under federal law notwithstanding the state provision.524 Over a dissent from Justice 
Stevens, the Court reasoned that the relevant framework for analyzing Section 522(f) 
is federal bankruptcy law and not state exemption law.525 
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia began his analysis with a helpful 
framework for understanding exemptions and the interplay between federal and state 
law:  
  
                                                      
519 Thanks to Justice Gorsuch, this load has been lightened: indeed, while on the Tenth 
Circuit, Justice Gorsuch took up Justice Scalia’s suggestion and, largely sua sponte, 
developed a historical argument for a clearer rule based on the structure of the English 
bankruptcy system at the time Article III was adopted. In re Renewable Energy Dev. Corp., 
792 F.3d 1274, 1281–82 (10th Cir. 2015).  
520 Owen, 500 U.S. at 309. 
521 Id. at 306–08. 
522 Id. at 306–07. 
523 Id. at 307–08. 
524 Id. at 313–14. 
525 Id. at 312–13. 
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An estate in bankruptcy consists of all the interests in property, legal and 
equitable, possessed by the debtor at the time of filing, as well as those 
interests recovered or recoverable through transfer and lien avoidance 
provisions. An exemption is an interest withdrawn from the estate (and 
hence from the creditors) for the benefit of the debtor. Section 522 
determines what property a debtor may exempt. Under § 522(b), he must 
select between a list of federal exemptions (set forth in § 522(d)) and the 
exemptions provided by his State, “unless the State law that is applicable 
to the debtor . . . specifically does not so authorize,” § 522(b)(1)—that is, 
unless the State “opts out” of the federal list. If a State opts out, then its 
debtors are limited to the exemptions provided by state law. Nothing in 
subsection (b) (or elsewhere in the Code) limits a State’s power to restrict 
the scope of its exemptions; indeed, it could theoretically accord no 
exemptions at all.526  
 
That last clause is striking. More than three-quarters of states have opted out of 
federal exemption law and require their citizens to use only the slate of exemptions 
provided by their individual state.527 Is it beyond the realm of possibility that a state 
might decide to eliminate all exemptions?528 And if that day came, wouldn’t a debtor 
have a conceivable argument that the state was thwarting the purpose of the 
Bankruptcy Code by deterring its residents from availing themselves of bankruptcy 
protections? If so, Justice Scalia’s musing about this “theoretical” possibility might 
have some persuasive force, especially with seven justices signing on to it. The 
inclusion seems mischievous, particularly coming from a Justice who so carefully 
policed others’ “mischief.”529 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
As with Justice Scalia’s overall jurisprudence, his bankruptcy jurisprudence 
has two striking features: first, a strong and vocal commitment to clear and 
predictable rules; and second, occasional departures from those very same rules.  
These occasional departures are not surprising. As Professor Nelson noted, 
“rigorously principled decisionmaking may be too much to expect from any judges,” 
even those who are the staunchest proponents of rule-based textualism.530 Like any 
                                                      
526 Id. at 308 (alterations in original) (emphasis added). 
527 See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 112, at 166–67.  
528 See Posner, supra note 69, at 52–53 (suggesting that states might enact 
“suboptimally stingy exemption laws in order to drive impoverished debtors to other states”). 
529 See, e.g., Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 716 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(noting the “great potential for mischief federal judges have discovered” in a soon-to-be-
overruled Supreme Court decision); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 70, at 377 
(“Legislative history creates mischief both coming and going—not only when it is made but 
also when it is used. With major legislation, the legislative history has something for 
everyone.”). 
530 Nelson, supra note 30, at 397–98. 
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approach to judicial decisionmaking, rule-based textualism should not be considered 
a failed philosophy merely because one of its proponents did not follow the rules in 
every instance. Particularly given the unique context of bankruptcy law, it is 
worthwhile to evaluate the impact of Justice Scalia’s endorsement of rules that 
promoted clarity and predictability, even if he did not always apply those rules 
consistently. As Professor William Eskridge of Yale Law School aptly wrote: 
 
Scalia was the Supreme Court’s Rule of Law Conscience. Often in noisy 
dissent or grumpy concurrence, but increasingly as the author of majority 
opinions, Scalia reminded, admonished and scolded his colleagues and the 
entire legal community that modern law is all about public text—the text 
of statutes, of agency regulations and the text of the Constitution itself. . . . 
 
He demanded that legal interpretation be neutral, objective and 
predictable—though not entirely free of norms, for statutory purpose and 
constitutional principles are pervasively relevant. His was and remains an 
important voice, because judges facing hard cases are constantly tempted 
to read their own preferred results into legal texts whose ordinary meaning 
and the overall course of law often run in the other direction. That Scalia 
himself fell prey to this temptation from time to time reveals the justice to 
have been human, even as his advice remains classic.531 
 
Professor Eskridge’s description is even more potent when applied to Scalia’s 
contributions to bankruptcy law. In many ways, Justice Scalia’s focus on holistic 
interpretation, textual justice, and clear rules were—and may continue to be—a boon 
to the field, notwithstanding the occasional mixed messages that he sent to judges 
and litigants. Perhaps with some willingness to forgive Justice Scalia for being 
human, we could agree that he offered the right philosophy at the right time for the 
modern bankruptcy code.   
                                                      
531 Symposium, supra note 15, at 4–5.  
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APPENDIX B – JUSTICES RANKED BY TOTAL BANKRUPTCY WRITINGS 
 
* unanimous decision drew a concurrence 
^ concur in part and dissent in part 
 
1. Justice Scalia (25 total, 11 lead) 
 
Unanimous (7): United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 
Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988); U.S. Bank Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 
18 (1994); Citizens Bank v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16 (1995); Hartford Underwriters 
Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1 (2000); Young v. United States, 
535 U.S. 43 (2002); RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 
639 (2012); Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188 (2014). 
 
Majority (4): Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305 (1991); United States v. Nordic Vill. 
Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992); BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994); FCC 
v. NextWave Pers. Commc’ns. Inc., 537 U.S. 293 (2003). 
 
Concurrence (9): Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989); Hoffman v. 
Conn. Dep’t of Income Maint., 492 U.S. 96 (1989); Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53 
(1990); Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151 (1991); Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 
753 (1992); Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695 (1995); Raymond B. Yates, 
M.D., P.C. Profit Sharing Plan v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1 (2004); Milavetz, Gallop & 
Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229 (2010); Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 
462 (2011). 
 
Dissent (5): Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004); Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 
U.S. 410 (1992); Dep’t of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994); 
Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505 (2010); Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 562 
U.S. 61 (2011). 
 
2. Justice Stevens (24 total, 7 lead) 
 
Unanimous (3): Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991); Bd. of Governors of the 
Fed. Reserve Sys. v. MCorp Fin., 502 U.S. 32 (1991); Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 
U.S. 151 (1991).* 
 
Majority (4): Cal. State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, 490 U.S. 844 (1989); 
Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695 (1995); Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 
U.S. 356 (2006); Marrama v. Citizens Bank, 549 U.S. 365 (2007). 
 
Plurality (1): Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004). 
 
Concurrence (5): Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992); Nobelman v. 
Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993); Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526 
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(2004); Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006); FCC v. NextWave Pers. 
Commc’ns. Inc., 537 U.S. 293 (2003). 
 
Dissent (11): Cent. Tr. Co. v. Official Creditors’ Comm. of Geiger Enters., Inc., 454 
U.S. 354 (1982); Hoffman v. Conn. Dep’t of Income Maint., 492 U.S. 96 (1989); 
Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305 (1991); Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991); United 
States v. Nordic Vill. Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992); Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393 
(1992); Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992); Celotex Corp. v. 
Edwards, 514 U.S. 300 (1995); Assocs. Comm’l Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997); 
Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434 
(1999); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137 (2009). 
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Unanimous (8): Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 503 U.S. 47 (1992); Nobelman v. Am. 
Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993); Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464 (1993); Things 
Remembered v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124 (1995)*; Rousey v. Jacoway, 544 U.S. 320 
(2005); United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260 (2010); Exec. 
Bens. Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165 (2014); Bank of Am., N.A. v. 
Caulkett, 135 S. Ct. 1995 (2015). 
 
Majority (5): Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992); Taylor v. Freeland 
& Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992); Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 
554 U.S. 33 (2008); Schwab v. Reilly, 560 U.S. 770 (2010); Baker Botts L.L.P. v. 
ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158 (2015). 
 
Concurrence (4): Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 
526 U.S. 434 (1999); Raymond B. Yates, M.D., P.C. Profit Sharing Plan v. Hendon, 
541 U.S. 1 (2004); Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004); Milavetz, Gallop 
& Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229 (2010).  
 
Dissent (5): United States v. Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 
213 (1996)^; Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314 (2003); Tenn. Student Assistance 
Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004); Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 
(2006); Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015). 
 
4. Justice Ginsburg (10 total, 7 lead) 
 
Unanimous (3): Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 
U.S. 443 (2004); Harris v. Viegelahn, 135 S. Ct. 1829 (2015). 
 
Majority (4): Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997); Raymond B. 
Yates, M.D., P.C. Profit Sharing Plan v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1 (2004); Marshall v. 
Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006); Howard Delivery Serv. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 547 
U.S. 651 (2006). 
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Concurrence (2): Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59 (1995); Things Remembered v. 
Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124 (1995). 
 
Dissent (1): Schwab v. Reilly, 560 U.S. 770 (2010). 
 
5. Justice Souter (9 total, 7 lead) 
 
Unanimous (3): United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535 (1996); Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc. 
v.  Fink, 522 U.S. 211 (1998); Raleigh v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15 (2000). 
 
Majority (4): Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59 (1995); United States v. Reorganized CF 
& I Fabricators of Utah Inc., 518 U.S. 213 (1996); Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. 
Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434 (1999); Travelers Indem. Co. v. 
Bailey, 557 U.S. 137 (2009).  
 
Concurrence (1): Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004).  
 
Dissent (1): BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994). 
 
6. Justice Rehnquist (9 total, 5 lead) 
 
Majority (5): United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982); NLRB v. 
Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984); Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393 (1992); 
Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300 (1995); Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. 
Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004). 
 
Concurrence (1): N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 
(1982). 
 
Dissent (3):  Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494 (1986); 
Dep’t of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994); Hubbard v. United 
States, 514 U.S. 695 (1995). 
 
7.  Justice Blackmun (9 total, 5 lead) 
 
Unanimous (2): United States v. Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. 198 (1983); Patterson v. 
Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992).* 
 
Majority (3): United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235 (1989); Toibb v. 
Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991); Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992).  
 
Concurrence (1): United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982).  
 
Dissent (4): Cal. State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, 490 U.S. 844 (1989); 
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Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989); Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. 
Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990); United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545 
(1990). 
 
8. Justice White (8 total, 5 lead) 
 
Unanimous (2): Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985)*; Norwest Bank Worthington 
v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988). 
 
Majority (3): United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545 (1990); Farrey v. 
Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291 (1991); Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. 
P’ship, 507 U.S. 380 (1993). 
 
Plurality (1): Hoffman v. Conn. Dep’t of Income Maint., 492 U.S. 96 (1989). 
 
Dissent (2): N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982); 
Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989). 
 
9. Justice Breyer (8 total, 2 lead) 
 
Unanimous (1): Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 569 U.S. 267 (2013). 
 
Majority (1): Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314 (2003). 
 
Dissent (6): Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59 (1995); Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly 
Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33 (2008); FCC v. NextWave Pers. Commc’ns Inc., 537 
U.S. 293 (2003); Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011); Hall v. United States, 566 
U.S. 506 (2012); Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158 (2015). 
 
10. Justice O’Connor (7 total, 1 lead) 
 
Unanimous (1): Cohen v. De La Cruz, 523 U.S. 213 (1998). 
 
Concurrence (3): Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985); Hoffman v. Conn. Dep’t of 
Income Maint., 492 U.S. 96 (1989); Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 
(1992). 
 
Dissent (3): United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235 (1989); Pioneer Inv. 
Servs. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380 (1993); Dep’t of Revenue of 
Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994). 
 
11. Justice Sotomayor (5 total, 4 lead) 
 
Unanimous (1): Clark v. Rameker, 134 S. Ct. 2242 (2014). 
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Majority (3): Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229 
(2010); Hall v. United States, 566 U.S. 506 (2012); Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. 
Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015). 
 
Concurrence (1): Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158 (2015). 
 
12. Justice Marshall (5 total, 4 lead) 
 
Unanimous (2): Commodity Futures Trading Com v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 
(1985); Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991). 
 
Majority (2): Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53 (1990); Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. 
Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990). 
 
Dissent (1): Hoffman v. Conn. Dep’t of Income Maint., 492 U.S. 96 (1989). 
 
13. Justice Alito (4 total, 2 lead) 
 
Unanimous (1): Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 
443 (2007). 
 
Majority (1): Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505 (2010). 
 
Concurrence (1): Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015). 
 
Dissent (1): Marrama v. Citizens Bank, 549 U.S. 365 (2007). 
 
14. Justice Kennedy (4 total, 1 lead) 
 
Majority (1): Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526 (2004). 
 
Concurrence (2): Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291 (1991); Things Remembered 
v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124 (1995). 
 
Dissent (1): Howard Delivery Serv. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 651 (2006). 
 
15. Chief Justice Roberts (3 total, 2 lead) 
 
Unanimous (1): Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 135 S. Ct. 1686 (2015). 
 
Majority (1): Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011). 
 
Dissent (1): Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015). 
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16. Justice Brennan (2 total, 0 lead) 
 
Plurality (1): N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
 
Dissent (1): NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).^ 
 
17. Justice Kagan (1 total, 1 lead) 
 
Majority (1): Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 562 U.S. 61 (2011). 
 
18.  Justice Powell (1 total, 1 lead) 
 
Majority (1): Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494 (1986). 
 
19. Chief Justice Burger (1 total, 0 lead) 
 
Dissent (1): N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
 
 
